Seven trends regarding the categories that tend to be impaired/preserved in category-specific semantic deficits were identified. The authors hypothesized that these trends arise despite the multiple sources of variation in patient testing because numerous factors that structure semantic memory probabilistically converge to make some categories of knowledge more susceptible to damage than others. Analysis of semantic feature norms and corpus data for 541 concepts revealed that differences in the distribution of knowledge types across categories are sufficient to explain 6 of the trends and are necessary to explain loss of knowledge about nonliving things. Feature informativeness, concept confusability, visual complexity, familiarity, and name frequency contributed to this patterning and provide insight into why knowledge about living things is most often impaired.
From infancy on, human beings acquire vast amounts of knowledge about living and nonliving things from watching them, using them, observing others use them, and talking and reading about them. In a typical day, people watch animals move about; manipulate tools and utensils; prepare, smell, and taste food; and hear musical instruments. From these interactions, people develop internal representations that allow them to discuss and reason about these objects. This knowledge is often referred to as semantic knowledge, and the memory systems involved in the representation and processing of such knowledge are called semantic memory. People are amazed by the development of semantic knowledge in infants and troubled by its loss in debilitating conditions like dementia of the Alzheimer type, but for most of their adult lives, they simply take semantic knowledge for granted.
In this article, we provide insight into how information about entities and objects is represented, organized, and computed. Our approach involved combining data generated from a large set of semantic feature production norms with constraints imposed by the patterns of impairments observed in patients with categoryspecific semantic deficits. The goal was to evaluate the efficacy of current models of semantic memory by assessing the major factors thought to structure semantic memory and influence semantic computations.
Category-Specific Semantic Deficits
Cases of category-specific semantic deficits are of particular interest to those studying semantic memory because regularities in patterns of impairment can be used to derive constraints on possible theories of semantic memory. Over 100 case studies have been reported, with deficits generally manifesting themselves as the loss of knowledge about items in some semantic domains (living things) relative to others (nonliving things).
1 Regularities within and across patients in terms of the sets of concepts that tend to be impaired/spared together constrain theories of the organization of semantic representations. One strategy for understanding their cause is to interpret first the primary dimensions along which the clusters of impaired and spared concepts can be discriminated and then the factors underlying these dimensions. Thus, the goal is to uncover factors that can be explained in terms of both the specific processing responsibilities of distinct brain regions and the general processing characteristics of the brain.
The most well-documented pattern of category-specific semantic deficits is where the concepts with which patients tend to have the most trouble come from either creatures, fruits/vegetables, or nonliving things. For example, a patient may have impaired ability to name (or provide information about) pictures of creatures and yet may retain the ability to do so for fruits/vegetables and nonliving things. The most transparent interpretation is that there is something special about belonging to various domains that causes information about all items from those domains to be stored in a distinct manner and perhaps in distinct neural regions (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Collins & Quillian, 1969; Sartori & Job, 1988) .
However, this explanation is deemed unsatisfactory by most researchers. Not only does it violate current knowledge of brain organization (Farah, Meyer, & McMullen, 1996) , in that there is strong evidence that brain systems are organized by function and/or modality (Martin, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000; ThompsonSchill, Aguirre, D'Esposito, & Farah, 1999) , but in addition a number of patients have presented with patterns of deficits that cross domain boundaries, making it unlikely that knowledge is organized by domain (e.g., impaired knowledge of creatures and fruits/vegetables, musical instruments, nonliving foods, and gemstones vs. relatively spared knowledge of other nonliving things; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) .
A number of theories of semantic memory organization have been proposed to account for these patterns of deficits. The major theories include the conceptual structure account (Tyler & Moss, 2001) , the correlated and distinguishing features account (Devlin, Gonnerman, Anderson, & Seidenberg, 1998; Gonnerman, Anderson, Devlin, Kempler, & Seidenberg, 1997) , the domain-specific hypothesis (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998) , the hierarchical interactive theory (HIT; ), the organized unitary content hypothesis (OUCH; , the psychological distance theory (Dixon, Bub, & Arguin, 1997 , 1998 Gaffan & Heywood, 1993) , the sensory/ functional theory (Warrington & Shallice, 1984) , and the closely related sensory/motor theory . The theories differentially emphasize the importance of several factors, including the types of knowledge typically used to describe and communicate about objects (e.g., sensory vs. functional knowledge; Farah & McClelland, 1991; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) ; the proportion of information available about an object that distinguishes it from other objects (Devlin et al., 1998; Warrington & McCarthy, 1987) ; similarity among objects, both visually and conceptually (Dixon et al., 1997 (Dixon et al., , 1998 Humphreys, Riddoch, & Quinlan, 1988) ; the complexity of the object's appearance (Funnell & Sheridan, 1992; Humphreys et al., 1988) ; how often one encounters, hears, or reads about various objects (concept familiarity and concept name frequency; Warrington, 1975) ; and regularities in the degree to which features tend to co-occur Gonnerman et al., 1997; McRae, de Sa, & Seidenberg, 1997; Tyler & Moss, 2001 ). Thus, the theories can be compared and contrasted on the basis of the importance placed on each factor. Table 1 summarizes the factors implicated in explaining category-specific semantic deficits. The implicated factors column delineates the factors that are explicitly stated to be important in each theory. The absence of a factor from a cell in this column does not necessarily mean that it is inconsistent with the theory; rather, the factor does not play an explanatory role in current expositions of the theory. The inconsistent factors column, however, highlights those factors that, if empirically supported, could be used to argue against a theory. The sparseness of entries in this column suggests that the theories share more similarities than differences.
Many of the similarities among the theories are due to shared underlying assumptions about the structure of the semantic system. All theories admit the existence of distinct representational areas for distributed visual, semantic, and lexical representations. Between layers, they all allow for weighted mappings that determine how the representational layers influence one another as parts of a dynamic, interactive system. To a large extent, these similarities are captured by the most recent model, Humphreys and Forde's (2001) HIT, and the general acceptance of these principles is reflected in the primarily positive tone of the commentaries accompanying that article. In Figure 1 , we depict the general architecture that can be abstracted from across all the models and map out the regions of the architecture at which each of the factors mentioned in Table 1 would be expected to have their primary influences.
Table 1 Description of the Theories Designed to Account for Category-Specific Semantic Deficits
The theories can be distinguished on the basis of their commitment to one of three views regarding how semantic representations are organized. Proponents of the conceptual structure account and the OUCH argue for a single, amodal semantic store in which structure emerges from the distribution of features across categories. Proponents of the sensory/functional theory and, to a lesser extent, the correlated and distinguishing features account, the HIT, and the psychological distance account all believe that semantic representations are distributed across sensory and functional semantic processing regions of the brain that are closely linked to sensory and motor input/output processing channels. Finally, the domain-specific hypothesis states that semantic representations are housed in processing channels specific to animals, plants, and nonliving objects that have evolved because of evolutionary pressures to avoid predators, find plants for food and medicine, and perhaps to use tools. Thus, as is clear from Table 1 , a major issue concerns whether semantic representations based on modal knowledge types can be supported empirically.
Given these similarities and differences among theories, some broad conclusions follow. Several theories directly contradict one another; for example, of the sensory/functional theory, the conceptual structure account, or the domain-specific hypothesis, only one can be true. Several others are complementary and await further converging evidence to make clear exactly how they should be integrated. Four questions immediately arise. First, is there independent and reliable empirical support for the sensory/functional theory? Second, can the sensory/functional theory be extended to account for the reliable tripartite distinction among creatures, fruits/vegetables, and nonliving things in cases of semantic impairment, or is the domain-specific hypothesis necessary to explain it? Third, is there evidence to support Gonnerman et al.'s (1997) claims regarding distributions of correlated and distinguishing features? Finally, is the conceptual structure account sufficient to explain all category-specific deficits without appeal to knowledge types? All of these questions are addressed below.
A major barrier to resolving debates surrounding these theories has been the lack of empirically derived quantitative estimates of the relevant distributional factors. For example, support for the sensory/functional theory turns on the ability to demonstrate, at a minimum, that the domains of living and nonliving things differ in the ratio of sensory to functional features of which their exemplars are composed. Although there exists some supportive empirical evidence (Farah & McClelland, 1991) , it has been demonstrated that the difference appears and disappears depending on the precise definition of sensory and functional information (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; McRae & Cree, 2002) . Similar debates exist with regard to the role of visual and conceptual similarity (Gale, Done & Frank, 2001; Humphreys et al., 1988; Humphreys & Riddoch, 2002; Laws & Gale, 2002) and statistical feature-feature and concept-feature variables (Shelton & Caramazza, 1999) . Evaluating the explanatory power of a factor hinges on understanding how it varies quantitatively across categories and whether regularities in its distribution across exemplars of various categories correlate with the likelihood that they are relatively spared or impaired in cases of deficits. Figure 1 . Shared architecture of major models of semantic memory organization, highlighting levels at which structural and computational factors are believed to have their major influence, and the three alternative models of organization at the semantic layer.
Main Hypothesis
One method that has shown promise for providing relevant evidence is feature norming. Feature-norming studies involve asking participants to list the features they think are important for entities and objects. This method has provided novel insights into accounts of living/nonliving dissociations (Devlin et al., 1998; ). However, those analyses have used small sets of concepts (see, e.g., , used 64 concepts) and therefore do not provide insight into the full breadth of factors across a large set of concepts. This was remedied by McRae and Cree (2002) , who used a large set of feature-production norms for 549 concepts to investigate how domains and categories differ in terms of the ratios of knowledge types and the proportion of correlated and distinguishing features of which their exemplars are composed. More specifically, McRae and Cree used a detailed cognitive knowledge-type taxonomy (28 types) developed by Wu and Barsalou (2002; henceforth referred to as WB) to analyze how the exemplars of 37 empirically derived categories differed in terms of the types of features provided by participants. Contrary to claims that living and nonliving things do not differ in terms of the ratio of sensory to functional features, they differed by at least a 2:1 ratio on 15 of the 28 knowledge types. McRae and Cree then constructed a representation of the 37 categories in terms of the importance of each knowledge type in each category. Hierarchical cluster analyses based on this representation provided insight into many of the patterns of impairment that have been reported in the literature. Finally, when the categories were sorted on the basis of the proportion of each exemplar's features that are distinguishing, they clearly grouped by domain, with the nonliving things having the most distinguishing features, followed by the fruits/vegetables, and finally the musical instruments and creatures. McRae and Cree concluded that it may be possible to explain the observed patterns of impairment in the patient data through appeal to a combination of the factors that structure semantic representations and influence semantic computations. These findings served as a major impetus for conducting the research reported herein.
In the current study, we derived quantitative estimates from a set of semantic feature production norms for 541 concepts spanning 34 categories, easily the largest such set in existence. We significantly extended our previous research by improving the major knowledge type, distinguishing features, and correlated features analyses; by presenting knowledge-type analyses based on brain regions; and by presenting analyses of feature distinctiveness, visual similarity, semantic similarity, visual complexity, concept familiarity, and word frequency. One further factor, formfunction correlations, has also been hypothesized to play a role in explaining category-specific semantic deficits De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1994; ). Unfortunately, we were not able to test this hypothesis because it was not clear how to derive a measure of the strength of these correlations from our feature norms.
We used these measures to provide insight into the following observations: The specific patterns of data reported in cases of category-specific semantic deficits arise from numerous sources, including the type and location of brain damage, variation in patients' premorbid knowledge, and variation in the tasks and stimuli used to establish deficits. Yet, despite this variability in testing, stable results have emerged in terms of the categories that tend to be relatively impaired or spared together. This suggested to us that, contrary to theories that focus on individual factors, there must be numerous factors contributing to the structure and computation of the meaning of concrete nouns that converge probabilistically to produce stability in results. Our goal was to provide empirical evidence regarding the role of each factor. We accomplished this by showing how the variables are distributed quantitatively across categories and by testing whether these distributional statistics can account for the regularities in patterns of impairment observed across patients. In this article, we describe how we tested each factor independently, then at the end present an analysis that combines them. Focus is placed on analyses at the level of superordinate categories such as fruits and tools and on sets of superordinate categories such as creatures, fruits/vegetables, and nonliving things. We also focus on data generalized across patients, rather than specific cases, so that we deal with relatively stable empirical phenomena. We then use these results to derive conclusions regarding current theories of semantic memory and associated accounts of category-specific deficits.
Sources of Variability in Case Studies
A number of sources of variability across case studies have implications for category-specific deficits. First, the diverse causes of brain damage (e.g., herpes simplex encephalitis, dementia of the Alzheimer type, cerebral infarcts) produce variation in both the degree to which the anterior and inferolateral temporal regions of cortex are affected (see Gainotti, 2000 , for a review) and the nature of the damage in these regions (focal vs. nonfocal). Second, time is a source of variability in two ways: the influence that brain damage can have on concentration and attention within and across test sessions, affecting test-retest reliability (Hultsch, MacDonald, Hunter, Levy-Bencheton, & Strauss, 2000; Shallice, 1988) , and in terms of the time period between the occurrence of damage, or onset of disease, and patient testing. Third, differences in patients' premorbid knowledge can influence the detail and complexity of semantic representations across categories (Dixon, Desmarais, Gojmerac, Schweizer, & Bub, 2002; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991) . Some such differences have been linked to gender (e.g., women may know more about furniture and fruits/vegetables, whereas men may know more about tools; Albanese, Capitani, Barbarotto, & Laiacona, 2000) , and these differences might be amplified in older populations who are more likely to have a stroke or a degenerative disease. Fourth, case studies differ in the tasks used, usually involving a subset of picture naming, word-picture matching, spoken-to-written-word matching, naming to definition, definition from words or pictures, object decision, feature verification, sound identification, identification from touch, part decision (does this part belong on this object?), and viewpoint matching. These tasks vary in numerous ways, including difficulty and the types of knowledge and computations required for performance. Finally, there is variation across studies in the categories, concepts, and features used as probes. Often, a small set of items is selected from a large domain without regard to how exemplars vary on the targeted factor and how the chosen subset of exemplars score on that factor. At the extreme, some patients' reported deficits have reversed when tested on different exemplars (Laws, 1998; Moss, Tyler, & Jennings, 1997) .
Behavioral Trends in the Patient Data
Despite the numerous sources of variation in tests for categoryspecific semantic deficits, there exist consistent trends in the data in terms of the categories that tend to be impaired/spared together. We identified 10 studies that both reported their items and encompassed the spectrum of patterns of deficits typically reported. Our trends are based primarily, but not exclusively, on the following 10 articles: Caramazza and Shelton (1998) ; Farah and Wallace (1992) ; Hart, Berndt, and Caramazza (1985) ; Hart and Gordon (1992) ; Hillis and Caramazza (1991) ; Hillis, Rapp, Romani, and Caramazza (1990) ; Sacchett and Humphreys (1992) ; Silveri and Gainotti (1988) ; Warrington and McCarthy (1983); and Warrington and Shallice (1984) . Trend 6: Musical instruments can be impaired along with living things. This is peculiar, given that they are nonliving things.
Trend 7: Living-things deficits are much more frequent than nonliving-things deficits.
We used these trends as the target behavioral phenomena for our investigation because they are most often the bases for arguments regarding theories of category-specific deficits. Furthermore, our norms include a number of exemplars of the relevant categories. We are unable to comment on an additional trend that body parts can be impaired along with nonliving things because our norms do not include body parts (see Barbarotto, Capitani, & Laiacona, 2001 , for a recent review). We decided against collecting norms for body parts because they are, by definition, parts, whereas our normed concepts refer to entire objects.
Semantic Feature Production Norms
The analyses presented herein, with the exception of those based on concept familiarity and word frequency, are based on semantic representations derived from a large set of semantic feature production norms that have been collected over several years. The 541 concepts in the norms were chosen to include those most often used in studies of concepts and categorization, semantic memory, and impairments of semantic memory. In the norming task, participants, primarily undergraduate students, were given 20 or 24 concept names such as cat and chair, with 10 blank lines beneath each name, and were asked to list features of the things to which the words referred. Each participant received no more than two similar concepts (e.g., cougar and leopard), and if two similar concepts were given to the same participant, they were presented on separate pages. Thirty participants listed features for each concept. After the experimenters recorded the features in a computer file (which is described in detail for a subset of the concepts in McRae et al., 1997), a representation was derived for each concept by retaining all features listed by at least 5 of 30 participants so that idiosyncratic responses were excluded. Thus, the norms provide empirically based featural representations for 541 concepts. Examples of two representations are presented in Appendix A.
As we and others have argued previously (Barsalou, 1999; McRae et al., 1997) , we do not believe that semantic knowledge is stored in the brain literally as a list of verbalizable features. We do believe, however, that when participants call to mind features to list in the norming task, they directly tap into representations that have developed through repeated multisensory exposure to, and interactions with, the various objects. These representations are also shaped by the types of explicit knowledge highlighted in knowledge-based theories of conceptual representation (Barrett, Abdi, Murphy, & Gallagher, 1993) . Thus, empirically derived features are assumed to provide a window into semantic memory, rather than a veridical record of semantic representations. Furthermore, we do not claim that the level of information tapped by the feature listing task is all that there is to semantic knowledge. Clearly, people know a lot more than this about category structure, including relations among features, causal relations, and category coherence (Sloman, Love, & Ahn, 1998; Waldmann, Holyoak, & Fratianne, 1995) , and accounting for performance on some tasks demands more complex types of knowledge than features provide (Keil, 1989) . However, the fact that participants in feature norming studies provide information that is important to many types of semantic tasks is evidenced by the multiple empirical successes of this approach (Hampton, 1997; McRae, Cree, Westmacott, & de Sa, 1999; Rosch & Mervis, 1975) . Crucially in the present case, because the behavioral phenomena associated with categoryspecific semantic deficits appear to best be captured by featurebased representations, we focused exclusively on this level of representation.
Categories
To study how the relevant factors are distributed quantitatively across categories, we needed to derive categories and their exemplars. Typically, researchers have designated categories and their exemplars a priori on the basis of intuition. In contrast, the norms enabled an empirical approach because participants were told that it was acceptable to include in their feature lists the category (or categories) to which the concept belongs, and they often produced this information. To determine category membership, we selected from the norms all concepts for which a superordinate category was produced by at least two participants. A superordinate category was included in our analyses if there were at least six concepts for which it was produced by at least two participants and there were at least two concepts for which it was listed by more than four participants. Bug was excluded as a category because it was synonymous with insect, which was included, and toy was excluded because although some participants categorized concepts such as tractor as a toy, the features they listed pertained to real tractors rather than toy ones.
A concept was included as an exemplar of a category if at least two participants listed the category name as a feature of the concept, with a few exceptions. Because food has been tested in the category-specific deficits literature using only nonliving things such as cake and pie, we removed all fruits, vegetables, and fish, plus rice and walnut, from the category food. In addition, we removed 26 exemplars in total because they were blatant errors (e.g., salamander as a fish). These selection criteria resulted in 34 categories, ranging in size from 133 exemplars (animal) to 6 exemplars (food). Concepts varied in the number of categories to which they belonged. An extreme example is alligator, which was included in the animal, reptile, carnivore, and predator categories. At the other end of the continuum, 110 nonliving things were not included in any category (e.g., anchor, certificate). These were analyzed as a miscellaneous nonliving-things category. Finally, three trees were not in any category (birch, cedar, pine) . Note, therefore, that results reported for the 34 categories are based on 538 concepts, rather than 541.
2 The list of those 538 concepts by category is presented in Appendix B.
Factor 1: Knowledge Types
One of the most active debates in this area concerns the degree to which different kinds of semantic knowledge are distributed across the cortex. On one side stand those who believe that semantic knowledge is instantiated as distributed patterns of activity across modality-specific processing regions that are situated beside and are closely linked to perceptual-processing areas (Allport, 1985; A. R. Damasio, 1989; Farah & McClelland, 1991; Warrington & McCarthy, 1987; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) . Thus, a concept's representation is the sum of the activation across primary sensory-processing channels, motor/action areas, higher order abstract-knowledge areas, and mediating association areas. On the other side are those who claim that semantic knowledge is stored in a modality-neutral semantic processing area Sartori & Job, 1988; Tyler & Moss, 2001) and that semantic knowledge is transduced from patterns of activation in sensory processing regions into amodal semantic representations.
Empirical support for the modality-specific viewpoint rests on demonstrating the differential importance of sensory versus functional knowledge in the representations of living and nonliving things, respectively (Farah & McClelland, 1991) . Proponents assume that the principles governing the formation of neural connections make it likely that semantic information related to specific input/output modalities is stored in regions close to their related sensory-input and motor-output processing regions (H. Damasio, Grabowski, Tranel, Hichwa, & Damasio, 1996; McGuire & Plaut, 1997; . One type of evidence supporting the sensory/functional theory is analyses of the verbal descriptors people use when they define and talk about objects (Farah & McClelland, 1991; Garrard, Patterson, Watson & Hodges, 1998; McRae & Cree, 2002) . The validity of these analyses is predicated on the assumption that when people define or describe objects, they instantiate a multisensory image (e.g., a perceptual symbol-system simulation; Barsalou, 1999) and read the salient features from that image, perhaps with some emphasis on the features that distinguish the object from other similar objects. Thus, if certain modalities of knowledge correspond to particular modalities of information in an object's representation, this will be reflected in the relative proportions of each type of feature listed in a norming task. The second type of evidence supporting the sensory/functional theory consists of neuroimaging studies that explore the cortical regions activated when people engage in semantic computations involving various types of object knowledge (Martin & Chao, 2001; Martin, Wiggs, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 1996) . The validity of data from neuroimaging studies is predicated on the assumption that when people perform relevant conceptual tasks, the neural regions responsible for processing types of knowledge are differentially activated.
The first empirical evidence to support the differential weighting hypothesis was presented by Farah and McClelland (1991) , who had participants underline visual and functional descriptors in dictionary definitions of living and nonliving things. Participants underlined a greater number of visual descriptors for living (2.60) than for nonliving things (1.57) but fewer functional descriptors for living (0.35) than for nonliving things (1.11). Farah and McClelland concluded first, that visual information is relatively more important than functional information for living things, whereas this is not so for nonliving things, and second, that visual information in terms of the number of attributes underlined is prevalent for both, whereas functional information is prevalent for nonliving things only. Supportive evidence has been reported both in the neuroimaging literature (Thompson-Schill et al., 1999) and in Farah and McClelland's computational model that simulated the relevant behavioral phenomena of the time. Thompson-Schill et al. (1999) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to demonstrate that visual-processing areas (left fusiform gyrus) are activated when accessing both visual and functional knowledge about living things but are activated when accessing only visual knowledge about nonliving things. They concluded that because functional knowledge is relatively impoverished for living things, 2 Note that there are a number of changes from McRae and Cree (2002) . First, three small categories (amphibian, boat, and tree) were excluded when the criterion changed from a minimum of five to six exemplars. Second, in the present case, it was assumed that when subjects listed Ͻa carϾ for concepts such as jeep, they were using a short, high-frequency word that is synonymous with Ͻan automobileϾ. Therefore, the production frequencies of those two taxonomic features were amalgamated, resulting in a new category, automobile. Third, instrument is no longer a category and actually should not have been in McRae and Cree. Fourth, we did not remove gun because it was both an exemplar and a category. Furthermore, this criterion was inconsistently applied in McRae and Cree, in that house and building were included in their analyses. Fifth, the miscellaneous nonliving-things category was added herein to include those items in the analyses. Sixth, seven concepts have since been removed from the norms because of ambiguity apparent in participants' responses (club: stick vs. organization; crane: bird vs. machine; file: nail file vs. paper in a cabinet; needle: sewing vs. hypodermic; skates: ice vs. roller; squash: vegetable vs. sport; and vice: tool vs. bad habit), and one has been removed because of unfamiliarity (many participants mistook herring for heron). Note also that although the text of McRae and Cree stated that all exemplars listed by at least one participant were included, this was an error. As in the present case, exemplars listed by at least two participants were included. Finally, the norms were scrutinized once again with the help of a colleague, and some of the revisions that ensued from that process resulted in small changes in various statistics.
computing it requires support from visual representations, whereas this is not the case for nonliving things.
However, neither of these sources of evidence have gone unchallenged. Caramazza and Shelton (1998) claimed that Farah and McClelland's (1991) instructions of what should count as sensory (visual appearance) and functional knowledge ("what the item does or what it is for, " Farah & McClelland, 1991, p. 342) were overly restrictive. Indeed, when they replicated Farah and McClelland's study using broader definitions (all sensory vs. all nonsensory properties), they found no evidence to support the modality-specific viewpoint (see also McRae & Cree, 2002) . Concerns also surround the neuroimaging evidence. For example, demonstrating that a neural area is activated reliably by items from a specific domain of knowledge does not imply that the area is necessary for performing the task at hand (Bub, 2000; Bub & Bukach, 2001) . Furthermore, questions have been raised about the appropriateness of statistical tests used to evaluate neuroimaging studies and inconsistencies across studies in the areas claimed to be involved in semantic processing (Devlin et al., 2002; Tyler & Moss, 2001 ). Finally, tests that purport to investigate differences in the processing of visual versus functional knowledge have used items that were inadequately controlled for difficulty (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998) and appropriateness of content (Cree & McRae, 2001) . Although more recent and detailed analyses of the ratios of sensory to functional features in feature norms McRae & Cree, 2002) and recent neuroimaging studies using high-resolution fMRI scanners (Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999) have alleviated some of these concerns, a healthy skepticism is warranted. More importantly, even if these issues were resolved, a fundamental problem still remains for the current formulation of the sensory/functional theory: The sensory/functional theory, in its current formulation, is incapable of accounting for reports that the domains of creatures (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998) , fruits/vegetables (Farah & Wallace, 1992) , and nonliving things (Warrington & McCarthy, 1987) can be independently impaired (i.e., the tripartite distinction).
There simply are too few degrees of freedom in a modalityspecific theory with only two types of knowledge to account for the first six trends in impairment outlined above. Although researchers have stated that a more complete formulation of the theory will include all relevant modality-specific processing channels (sound, smell, taste, touch; Allport, 1985; Warrington & McCarthy, 1987) , effectively adding degrees of freedom, this has yet to be formulated and defended empirically. As Caramazza and Shelton (1998) have pointed out, The claim that the relative weighting of the sensory and functional properties for discriminating among members of a semantic category provides the binding factor for some of the observed associations of category-specific deficits has never been developed in enough detail to allow serious consideration of its merits. (p. 5) To remedy this situation, we present two detailed analyses of the modality-specific theory of semantic organization.
The first analysis used the WB detailed knowledge-type taxonomy, which was developed independently of issues regarding category-specific deficits. Initially, we classified our features according to this taxonomy to better understand our norms and to develop stimuli for experiments with normal participants and then only more recently applied it to categoryspecific deficits. We previously presented analyses using this knowledge-type taxonomy in McRae and Cree (2002) . The first analysis presented herein was designed to obviate possible concerns with our previous analysis. The second analysis was based on a knowledge-type taxonomy that reflects known cortical processing regions, thus testing a version of the sensory/functional theory extended to nine knowledge types on the basis of current understanding of cortical processing regions. To date, little empirical evidence has been brought forth to support a specific decomposition into knowledge types in this manner and to provide a precise demonstration of the role that each knowledge type might play in distinguishing among categories (although, see , for evidence pertaining to, and discussion of, these issues). Wu and Barsalou's (2002) Knowledge-Type Taxonomy WB developed a knowledge-type taxonomy as part of studying perceptual simulations. They took a number of factors into account (L. W. Barsalou, personal communication, December 1999) . First, the feature types were designed to cover the tremendous variety that participants generate when describing conceptual content. Second, they were intended to capture the wide variety of information found in ontological kinds (Keil, 1989) and in event frames and verb arguments (Barsalou, 1992; Fillmore, 1968; Schank & Abelson, 1977) . Third, they were designed to correspond systematically to the modality-specific regions of the brain. Fourth, the feature types for entities reflect well-established channels of sensory information in perception (e.g., shape, surface, occlusion, movement). Fifth, they reflect aspects of introspective experience, as well as sensory-motor experience. The resultant taxonomy partitions features into four major classes: entity, situation, introspective, and taxonomic features. Features are then further subdivided within each class.
Given differences in the norming procedures used by WB and ourselves and resulting discussions with them, we have made several minor adjustments to the WB taxonomy. First, we added the feature type made-of because made-of features are frequent in our norms yet they did not fit into any existing WB feature type (they have subsequently added it). Second, ontological features were combined with superordinate features to avoid introducing a living/nonliving distinction. Third, abstract features were coded as systemic features (bread Ͻis nutritiousϾ). Finally, because the WB taxonomy was designed to capture information about objects and the typical situations into which they enter whereas our norms are designed to capture information about the objects themselves, there are no spatial relations, situation quantities, situation events, situation states of the world, representational states, or introspective quantities in our norms. Furthermore, there are no repetitions in our norms, and metacomments are idiosyncratic.
We previously used the WB taxonomy to examine how the salience of knowledge types differs across the domains of living versus nonliving things and across 37 categories (McRae & Cree, 2002) . The present analyses differ in a few ways. First, we were concerned that distinctions among categories were in part attributable to the fact that living things typically belong to more categories than do nonliving things and therefore have more taxonomic features (in particular, superordinates). Therefore, all five types of taxonomic features were omitted from the present analy-ses. In fact, no taxonomic feature is included in any analysis presented in this article (although the superordinates formed the basis for deriving categories, of course). Second, we collapsed action and manner features into one class because of their close relationship. Thus, the current WB analyses are based on 22 feature types, as presented in Appendix C. Finally, as outlined above, the slightly revised criteria for selecting categories resulted in 34 categories for all analyses presented herein.
To explore the role that feature types play in discriminating among the relevant sets of categories, we conducted a hierarchical cluster analysis and interpreted it with respect to the category-level trends. We constructed a matrix in which the 34 categories were represented in terms of the salience of each WB feature type. Each matrix element corresponded to the number of features of a specific feature type summed across all of the category's exemplars. For example, because 131 WB function features were listed for the 34 tool exemplars, the tool-WB function element had a value of 131. This representation captures the salience of the feature types for each category by ignoring the specific feature but registering that a feature of that type was listed for a category exemplar. An important consequence of coding vectors by feature type, as opposed to individual features, is that the resulting representation carries some information about feature similarity. In representations based on individual features, such as those used in published distributed models of semantic memory (Hinton & Shallice, 1991; McRae et al., 1997) , the degree to which features are similar is not represented in any direct manner (although it may be represented to some extent in terms of feature correlations). For example, if each feature is represented by a separate node, Ͻmade of cottonϾ is as similar to Ͻhas wingsϾ as it is to Ͻmade of woolϾ. In contrast, coding by feature type captures feature similarity at this level.
The matrix was entered into an average-linkage between-groups hierarchical cluster analysis using SPSS. This method of forming clusters begins by treating each of the 34 categories as a separate cluster and then agglomerating categories on the basis of the mean distances of all members in each cluster. Thus, categories and the resulting clusters are grouped on the basis of overall similarity of entire clusters, rather than the options of using nearest or farthest neighbors of clusters. Cosine, a measure of the angle between the category vector representations (the inner product of two vectors divided by the product of the vector lengths), was used as the measure of similarity. Comparable results were found using other clustering algorithms and measures of similarity. The resultant dendogram is presented in Figure 2 .
A dendogram represents similarity in two ways. The distance between terminal symbols (category names in Figure 2 ) generally reflects similarity. For example, vehicle is directly above automobile, and herbivore is directly above mammal. However, the more reliable indicator of similarity is the distance at which categories or clusters of categories are joined. The closer that the vertical line joining two clusters is to 0 on the scale at the top of Figure 2 , the more similar are the clusters. This scale is arbitrary except that 0 indicates identical clusters, whereas 25 indicates minimal cluster similarity for these data. Figure 2 shows definable clusters corresponding to each of the three major domains of creatures, fruits/vegetables, and nonliving things, respecting the tripartite distinction. In addition, the cluster analysis closely mirrors the other category-level trends, in that musical instruments do not cluster closely with any category and join the nonliving things at a very late stage, and foods cluster with the fruits/vegetables. To understand the solution, we compared the variances of the feature types across categories. A feature type's variance is related directly to its influence on the cluster results; if the cases (categories) do not vary on a variable (feature type), there is no basis on which to differentiate among them and thus cluster them. We began by normalizing the representations for the 34 categories, correcting for differences in the raw number of concepts and features by category. This is part of the cosine measure used in the cluster analysis. The variance of each feature type was then calculated across the 34 categories. In decreasing order, variance was greatest for WB functions, entity behaviors, external components, made-of features, internal surface properties, external surface properties, locations, and internal components. It decreased by 37% from the internal components (0.0108), which we included when investigating why the analysis succeeded, to the first excluded feature type, systemic properties (0.0068). We then conducted a principal components analysis on the matrix that was entered into the cluster analysis. The eight most variant feature types loaded on the first three principal components. On the basis of these two criteria, we scrutinized those eight feature types, which constituted 82% of the total number of features relevant to the cluster analysis.
To illustrate how the categories differ in terms of the importance of feature types, we provide eight figures depicting the distribution of feature-type salience for the categories that contain the creatures, nonliving things, fruits/vegetables, and test cases ( Figures  3A-3H) . The x-axis represents the scores, ranging from 0 to 0.799, increasing in increments of 0.05, with the first column of cones reflecting a score of 0, the next 0.001 to 0.05, and so on. A score of 0 reflects the fact that not a single feature of that type was listed for any of the relevant exemplars. A score falling between 0.75 and 0.799, which is the maximum range, implies that the feature type was extremely prevalent in representations of the relevant exemplars. Along the y-axis are the three domains and the two test cases. The z-axis reflects the number of categories within each domain that fell within each range. The number of categories appears on each cone and is visually depicted by the volume of the cone for easy comparison.
Creatures. The 12 creature categories cluster at the top of Figure 2 . The creatures possess few WB functions ( Figure 3A ; creatures serve few functions for people), many entity behaviors ( Figure 3B ; creatures do many things on their own), no made-of features ( Figure 3D ; people do not think of a creature as made of something), and few internal surface properties ( Figure 3E ; this information is not salient to people, so it is rarely listed in feature norms). In addition, 11 of the 14 highest ranked categories in terms of external components were creatures ( Figure 3C ; creatures possess many salient external components). However, the creatures were not distinguished from nonliving things on the basis of external surface properties ( Figure 3F ), locations ( Figure 3G ), or internal components ( Figure 3H ). That external surface properties played little role in discriminating between the domains is somewhat surprising given the role that sensory features have played in theories of category-specific deficits, although external components were important.
Nonliving things. The 16 nonliving-things categories cluster in the middle of Figure 2 . They are high on WB functions ( Figure 3A ), and the made-of features perfectly distinguish them from the other two domains ( Figure 3D ; what a nonliving thing is made of is salient but does not apply to creatures or fruits/vegetables). They are separated from the creatures on entity behaviors ( Figure 3B ; nonliving things tend to do little on their own), with the fruits/ vegetables interspersed among them. They also tend to possess fewer external components than do creatures ( Figure 3C ). Internal surface properties ( Figure 3E ) do not distinguish the nonliving things from the creatures, although they do distinguish them from the fruits/vegetables and foods. Finally, the nonliving things were not discriminated from the other categories in terms of external surface properties ( Figure 3F ), locations ( Figure 3G ), or internal components ( Figure 3H ).
Fruits/vegetables. The four fruits/vegetables categories cluster tightly, and they cluster at a late stage with the nonliving things rather than the creatures. The fruits/vegetables are distinguished on the basis of internal surface properties ( Figure 3E ). Furthermore, they are ranked 4th, 8th, 9th, and 10th in terms of internal components ( Figure 3H ). These results reflect the fact that their insides are salient because people open them up and eat them. Likewise, external surface properties are relatively salient for fruits/vegetables ( Figure 3F ), reflecting the fact that color and shape are important aspects of their representations. They cluster with the nonliving rather than the living things because they are interspersed throughout them on the basis of WB function ( Figure 3A ; people peel, cook, bake, and eat them), entity behaviors ( Figure  3B ; they do very little on their own), and external components ( Figure 3C ; they tend to have few external components other than, for example, a peel and a stem). Finally, the fruits/vegetables are (text continues on page 174) not distinguished from the other categories on the basis of locations ( Figure 3G ). Foods. Although foods contain only nonliving things such as cake and pie, they cluster with the fruits/vegetables. Foods group with them in terms of WB function ( Figure 3A ; people cook and eat them), entity behaviors ( Figure 3B ; they do very little on their own), and internal surface properties ( Figure 3E ; their inside is salient because it is a major factor determining whether they are good to eat). Foods cluster relatively late with the fruits/vegetables because they possess a greater number of made-of features ( Figure  3D ; an apple is not made of something, but a cake is), fewer location features ( Figure 3G ; the locations in which fruits/vegetables grow are relatively salient), and fewer internal components ( Figure 3H ; cake, pie, and bread have few internal components). Thus, the cluster analysis indicates that foods may be impaired with living things because of their close relationship to fruits/ vegetables in terms of salient feature types.
Musical instruments.
This category serves as a valuable test case because it often has been found, counterintuitively, to pattern with living things. In Figure 2 , the musical instruments are the final category to cluster with the other nonliving things, highlighting the fact that they are different from these categories on several dimensions. Musical instruments are relatively low in WB function features, with only one nonliving-things category ranking lower ( Figure 3A ; they are used for basically one reason, to play music). They are high in entity behaviors ( Figure 3B ), ranking with the creatures, primarily because of the sounds that they make. It is interesting to note that when Tranel, Logan, Frank, and Damasio (1997) conducted principal components analyses based on participants' ratings of a number of dimensions of living and nonliving things, they found that sounds are important for discriminating among categories. Musical instruments are ranked higher than all but two nonliving-things categories in terms of external surface properties ( Figure 3F ) and lower than all of them in terms of locations ( Figure 3G ) and internal components ( Figure 3H ). Finally, they are in the middle of the nonliving things in terms of external components ( Figure 3C ), made-of features ( Figure 3D ), and internal surface properties ( Figure 3E ). The clustering result with musical instruments is the only important difference between this WB analysis and the WB analysis presented in McRae and Cree (2002) , in which they clustered late with the creatures. There are two things to note, however. First, musical instruments remain an outlier and clearly do not fit in well with the categories designated as nonliving things. Second, a number of the susceptibility analyses presented below demonstrate why musical instruments often pattern with the living things in terms of impairment.
Beyond a Sensory/Functional Dichotomy
Contrary to recent claims that theories based on differential ratios of knowledge types are insufficient to account for the tripartite distinction (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Mahon & Caramazza, 2001; Shelton & Caramazza, 1999) , this knowledge-type analysis accounts for the distinction because it is more detailed than a sensory/functional dichotomy. Furthermore, it provides insight into the category-level trends, which are a more stringent test. We outline three of the primary ways in which moving beyond a sensory/functional dichotomy was essential to this success.
First, in the WB taxonomy, internal components and internal surface properties are separated from other sensory features. These knowledge types are important in explaining part of the tripartite distinction in that they help distinguish the fruits/vegetables, for which these feature types are important, from creatures and nonliving things, for which they are not. They also were a key reason why foods clustered with the fruits/vegetables rather than with the nonliving things. It is difficult to know how these feature types would have been classified in, for example, the Farah and McClelland (1991) dictionary-definition underlining task.
Second, it was important to separate entity behaviors (what a thing does) from functional information (what humans use it for). Pulling apart these knowledge types is one reason why the creatures cluster separately from the fruits/vegetables and the nonliving things. It also is part of the explanation of why musical instruments cluster so late with the other nonliving things. In Farah and McClelland's (1991) dictionary-definition underlining task in which functional features were defined as "what it does or what it is used for," these knowledge types would have been conflated, masking their potential role. Finally, made-of features played an important role in several contrasts. Not only did they pull the nonliving things away from the other domains but, because they are more salient for foods than for fruits/vegetables, they were one reason why foods clustered with the fruits/vegetables at a somewhat late stage. It is unclear whether, in a dictionary-definition underlining task, participants would count this type of knowledge as being sensory or non-sensory. For example, although the feature Ͻmade of metalϾ implies sensory properties such as being silver and shiny, it might also be considered to be a non-sensory statement about the manner in which the object is made.
Brain Region Knowledge-Type Taxonomy
An appealing aspect of the sensory/functional theory is that a clear argument can be made concerning how these knowledge types map onto neural processing regions. A theoretical limitation of the WB knowledge-type analysis is that it is far from clear how the 22 (or even the 8 most important) knowledge types map onto brain regions. We believe that it would be misguided to attempt such a mapping because many of the knowledge types contain features that clearly map onto different brain areas. For example, the internal surface properties include features referring to taste, smell, texture, color, and other aspects of visual appearance. Analyses of this sort would be more convincing, and ultimately more useful for researchers who wish to tie knowledge types to brain regions that may be differentially damaged, if the taxonomy reflected the brain regions thought to be responsible for processing each type of knowledge. Therefore, we developed a knowledgetype taxonomy that we believe both can be linked to neural processing regions and incorporates minimal assumptions. We classified features into nine knowledge types, three corresponding to visual information (visual-color, visual-parts and surface properties, and visual-motion) , four corresponding to other primary sensory-processing channels (smell, sound, tactile, and taste), one corresponding to functional/motor information regarding the ways in which people interact with objects (function), and one (encyclopedic) corresponding to all other knowledge types. Although we believe that these nine knowledge types are not the only important types of information processed in distinct neural regions, these are the only ones that we felt comfortable positing given the current state of the literature.
As was discussed earlier, proponents of knowledge-types theories typically argue that semantic knowledge corresponding to each modality is stored in brain regions close to, or even overlapping with, the primary sensory/motor processing channels in which semantic knowledge is grounded (Allport, 1985; H. Damasio et al., 1996; Martin & Chao, 2001; Warrington & McCarthy, 1987) . Evidence for this type of theory comes in several forms. Detailed neurophysiological studies of neural systems have revealed separate processing channels for different types of sensory information at early processing stages (e.g., color, form, and stereopsis; Hubel & Livingstone, 1987 ) that may continue into deeper processing regions. Evidence that semantic information is stored close to related perceptual processing regions comes from positron emission tomography, fMRI, and event-related potential (ERP) studies in which regions close to, but not identical to, the perceptual processing regions were activated in tasks that tapped semantic knowledge pertaining to distinct modalities (see Martin & Chao, 2001 , for a review). We present a brief overview of this evidence as it relates to the nine brain region knowledge types that we hypothesize.
Retrieval of knowledge about object color has been found to activate ventral regions of the posterior temporal lobes (bilateral fusiform gyrus; Martin, Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, & Ungerleider, 1995) just anterior to ventral occipital areas active during color perception (Corbetta, Miezin, Dobmeyer, Shulman, & Peterson, 1990; Sakai et al., 1995; Zeki et al., 1991) . Reports of similar patterns of activation during generation of color imagery in unimpaired participants and in color-word synesthetes (Paulesu et al., 1995) provide converging evidence that these areas are not simply driven by external input. Thus, we placed all color features in their own knowledge type (visual-color).
Second, knowledge about high-level visual form is thought to be housed in ventrooccipitotemporal cortex (Martin et al., 1996; Thompson-Schill et al., 1999) . Overlapping regions plus those just anterior to these form-processing areas are activated when participants viewed real objects relative to nonsense objects (Martin et al., 1996) . Thus, the visual-parts and surface properties knowledge type included all external and internal components and all external and internal surface properties that refer to visual aspects, excluding color. Although the made-of features (e.g., key Ͻmade of metalϾ) could be interpreted as either visual (silver, shiny) or tactile (hard, cold) information (ignoring more complex semantic information that participants may have been trying to convey in a compact manner), we believed that participants were most likely conveying visual information, so we coded them as visual-parts and surface properties. Third, generating action names when given the name of a nonmanipulable nonliving thing (e.g., cart) produces activation in the posterior region of the left middle temporal gyrus, just anterior to sites active during motion perception (Martin et al., 1995) . Areas superior to this, in the superior temporal sulcus, have been implicated in the processing of biological motion (Oram & Perrett, 1994) . Furthermore, damage to areas at the borders of the occipital, temporal, and parietal lobes can cause impaired motion perception (Zeki, 1991; Zihl, Von Cramon, Mai, & Schmid, 1991) , and activation in this area has been reported in unimpaired participants who were viewing object motion (Beauchamp, Cox, & De Yoe, 1997) . The majority of entity behaviors in our norms correspond to biological motion (e.g., ϽjumpsϾ), albeit without capturing the complex relational information about the parts that make up the movements. The relevant features from that WB feature type were classified as visual-motion features. 4 Likewise, few researchers would disagree that there are distinct sensory-processing channels for auditory, olfactory, taste, and tactile information. Recently, Allen, Inoue, Osterhout, and McLaughlin (2002) presented fMRI data revealing activations in the dominant hand and finger areas of primary somatosensory and motor cortex when participants read adjectives referring to tactile properties of objects and peak activation in olfactory areas (piriform cortex and right lateral orbital-frontal cortex) when participants read sentences containing adjectives referring to olfactory information. Consistent with these patterns of activation, corresponding ERP data revealed large sources of current flow in the left sensory-motor area for tactile adjectives and right lateralfrontal areas for olfactory adjectives 200 -400 ms after word onset. On the basis of this and similar evidence, we removed all sound, smell, taste, and tactile features from their WB knowledge types and placed them in their respective brain region knowledge types.
Objects with associated motor actions (function) activated regions in the left ventral premotor cortex when participants viewed pictures of them or name actions associated with them (Chao & Martin, 2000; Grabowski, Damasio, & Damasio, 1998; Grafton, Fadiga, Arbib, & Rizzolatti, 1997; Martin et al., 1996) . Indeed, imagining manipulating objects can produce activation in the ventral premotor cortex (Gerardin et al., 2000) . Thus, because the action/manner features in the WB taxonomy correspond roughly to what people think of when they describe the motor movements associated with objects and the function and participant features describe the complex ways in which people interact with objects, we hypothesized the existence of a function knowledge type that contained these three WB knowledge-type features (function).
Finally, features that did not fit the other eight knowledge types were classified as encyclopedic. Essentially, the encyclopedic knowledge type served as a catchall for semantic information that could not be clearly linked to a neural processing region or for which there was an insufficient number of features to justify creating a new knowledge type. For example, although affect/ emotion features could be argued to be linked to limbic regions, we classified them as encyclopedic because there were only 23 such features.
We conducted a hierarchical cluster analysis and interpreted the solution in terms of the category-level trends in impairment. The methods were identical to those of the WB cluster analysis. The dendogram, presented in Figure 4 , can be interpreted as forming three main clusters-creatures, fruits/vegetables, and nonliving things-thus preserving the tripartite distinction. In addition, the foods cluster at a late stage with the fruits/vegetables, and the musical instruments essentially form their own cluster and join at a late stage with the nonliving things. Overall, the results are remarkably similar to those of the WB cluster analysis given the substantial differences between taxonomies.
We interpreted the cluster analysis using the same techniques as for the WB cluster analysis. The knowledge types, in decreasing order of magnitude of variance, were function, visual-motion, visual-parts and surface properties, encyclopedic, visual-color, taste, sound, tactile, and smell. We conducted a principal components analysis on the matrix that was entered into the cluster analysis. Because all nine knowledge types loaded highly on the three principal components with eigenvalues greater than one, they were used to interpret the cluster analysis.
Creatures. The creature categories cluster together at the top of Figure 4 . They are 12 of the 14 lowest in function features ( Figure 5A ; creatures serve few functions for people) and are the 12 highest in visual-motion features ( Figure 5B ; creatures engage in self-initiated actions). Thus, these two feature types essentially separate creatures from all other categories. In addition, creatures are above the majority of the nonliving things but below the majority of the fruits/vegetables in visual-color features.
Nonliving things. The nonliving things cluster in the middle of Figure 4 . They differ from creatures by having a greater number of function features ( Figure 5A ), and fewer visual-motion ( Figure  5B ) and visual-color features ( Figure 5E ). They differ from the fruits/vegetables by having more salient visual-parts and surface properties ( Figure 5C ) and fewer visual-color ( Figure 5E ) and taste features ( Figure 5F ). The gun category is the final nonlivingthings category to cluster with the others (besides musical instru-ments and foods) because guns are the second highest category on sound features, behind only musical instruments ( Figure 5G) .
Fruits/vegetables. The fruits/vegetables cluster together, separate from the creatures and nonliving things, and they cluster at a late stage with the nonliving rather than the living things. They are distinguished from the creatures and nonliving things by being high in both visual-color ( Figure 5E ) and taste features ( Figure  5F ). Additionally, they are distinguished from the creatures by being low in visual-motion ( Figure 5B ), visual-parts and surface properties ( Figure 5C ), and sounds ( Figure 5G ). Finally, the fruits/ vegetables cluster at a late stage with the nonliving things because they are similar to them in being high in functions ( Figure 5A ; people eat and prepare them) and low in visual-motion features ( Figure 5B ).
Foods. Although the foods category contains only nonliving things, it clusters with the fruits/vegetables, which are all living things. Foods are similar to the fruits/vegetables in terms of function ( Figure 5A ; people prepare and eat them), taste ( Figure 5F ; being the highest category on this knowledge type), tactile ( Figure  5H ), and smell features ( Figure 5I ). In addition, the foods deviate from the nonliving things by being high in taste ( Figure 5F ) and smell features ( Figure 5I ) and the lowest category on visual-parts and surface properties ( Figure 5C ). Finally, foods are the highest category on encyclopedic features ( Figure 5D) .
Musical instruments. The musical instruments cluster at a late stage with the nonliving things. They are best distinguished from them by their high number of sound features ( Figure 5G ; most of (text continues on page 181) people's experience with them is through recorded music), and they are higher than all but one nonliving-things category on visual-color features ( Figure 5E ). They are distinguished from the creatures by having no visual-motion ( Figure 5B ), taste ( Figure  5F ), or smell ( Figure 5I ) features. Finally, they are the lowest category on encyclopedic features ( Figure 5D ).
Beyond the Sensory/Functional Theory
In summary, like the WB knowledge-types analysis, this analysis accounts for the first six category-level trends. No single knowledge type, or even pair of knowledge types, is capable of explaining the first six category-level trends in impairment. Instead, the interpretation of the cluster analysis must be based on interactions among the nine knowledge types, implying that they all play a role in distinguishing among the categories. There are, however, several contrasts that are particularly important. First, the creatures are distinguished from the other categories by having many visual-motion and few function features. Fruits/vegetables are distinguished from both creatures and nonliving things by both the high salience of visual-color and taste features and the low number of visual-parts and surface properties in their representations. Foods are high in tactile, taste, and encyclopedic features and are low in visual-parts and surface properties, distinguishing them from the creatures and nonliving things. Sounds are salient for musical instruments, as are their visual-parts and surface properties, whereas musical instruments are low in encyclopedic features, implying that little about them is salient to the average person other than their sounds, appearances, and function. Thus, on the basis of these analyses, we conclude that damage to specific neural regions (or combinations of regions) that are responsible for processing modality-specific types of semantic knowledge could contribute to category-specific semantic deficits.
To understand why the WB and brain region knowledge-type taxonomies produced similar clustering solutions, we examined the extent to which the features that contribute most to each solution dominate particular knowledge types in the two taxonomies and interpreted this in relation to data presented in Figures 3 and 5. First, functions are critical for distinguishing between creatures and nonliving things in both analyses. This is true regardless of whether one uses a slightly restricted definition of function, as in WB, or includes action/manner and participant information, as in the brain region taxonomy. Second, that creatures engage in self-initiated motion is also important for distinguishing between creatures and nonliving things. Motion information dominates the entity-behavior knowledge type in the WB analysis and constitutes the entire visual-motion knowledge type in the brain region analysis. Third, in both analyses, the fruits/ vegetables and foods are like the nonliving things in terms of the two most important distinctions just mentioned (function and motion) and thus cluster with the nonliving things at a late stage in both analyses. However, they form their own cluster in both analyses because of the importance of internal surface properties and components in the WB analysis and of taste information (which forms a subset of the internal properties features) in the brain region analysis. The fact that tactile and visual-color features are pulled out of the external surface properties (WB) for the brain region analysis serves to amplify the distinctions between fruits/vegetables and the other domains in the brain region analysis and to compensate for the role that internal surface properties and components play in the WB analysis. Finally, sound features, which are particularly important in the representations of musical instruments, pull this category away from the other nonliving things. This information is included as entity behaviors in the WB analysis and as its own knowledge type in the brain region analysis, resulting in a magnification of this effect. Thus, although the WB knowledge types cannot be mapped clearly onto distinct brain regions, they obviously capture many of the distinctions that are important for explaining category-specific deficits and provide insight at an emergent cognitive level.
Finally, a current point of contention regarding knowledge-type theories concerns how to define functional knowledge (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; McRae & Cree, 2002) . One possible reason that most researchers have used broad definitions of functional knowledge is that knowledge about motor programs may be a type of procedural knowledge that is relatively cognitively impenetrable. Therefore, standard tasks used in the cognitive literature to assess people's knowledge about objects are not likely to reveal much of this type of knowledge. The function features we used in the brain region cluster analysis included action/manner, participant, and function features from the WB taxonomy. To test whether the brain region cluster analysis results would change substantially if we limited the features included in the function knowledge type to only motor-program-type knowledge, we reconducted the analyses including only the WB action/manner features as functional features and designated the remaining ones as encyclopedic features. This yielded the same pattern of clustering that was observed in the main brain region cluster analysis, but the creatures and nonliving things primarily were distinguished on the basis of visual-motion and encyclopedic (rather than function) features. There simply were not enough action/manner features to discriminate neatly between these domains. Most importantly, regardless of whether a narrow or broad definition of function knowledge is used, the analyses account for the tripartite distinction among creatures, fruits/vegetables, and nonliving things and provide insight into why the interesting test cases of foods and musical instruments pattern as they do in impairment. Finally, more broadly, there currently are theories of functional knowledge such as HIPE (history, intentional perspective, physical environment, event sequences; Barsalou, Sloman, & Chaigneau, in press ) that argue that four domains of knowledge with 14 components nested within them are necessary to account for the full breadth of conceptualizations regarding functional knowledge. We regard the various types of function features in our norms as referencing important subsets of this knowledge.
Before presenting further interpretation of the relation between lesion sites and the patterns of deficits they imply, we present data regarding the influence of other factors that may contribute to the structure and computation of concrete noun concepts. Taken in isolation, the knowledge-type analysis appears to offer no insight into Trend 7, the fact that living-things impairments occur much more frequently than nonliving-things impairments. Therefore, we tested a number of factors for their potential influence on the susceptibility of domains and categories to impairment.
Susceptibility to Impairment
It appears that additional elements must be added to a knowledge-type theory for it to explain why some categories are more susceptible to impairment than others. One possibility (an example of which was outlined above) is a linking theory tying knowledge types to distinct brain regions, accompanied either by evidence that the relevant brain regions are differentially susceptible to damage or by evidence regarding the precise area(s) of damage in specific patients. This approach has been adopted by proponents of the sensory/functional theory (Gainotti, Silveri, Daniele, & Giustolisi, 1995) . For example, it often is argued that higher level visual computations necessary for distinguishing among living things are housed in the inferior temporal regions, which are particularly susceptible to damage from herpes simplex viral encephalitis. In contrast, cross-modal sensory integration computations of functional/motor information necessary for discriminating among nonliving things are believed to occur in the inferior parietal lobe, which may be damaged by cerebral infarct. Living-things deficits are more prevalent because a greater number of the patients who present with category-specific deficits suffer from herpes simplex viral encephalitis than from cerebral infarcts.
It is also possible that further factors are partially, if not primarily, responsible for determining the prevalence of various types of impairments. These factors may be important because brain damage is typically not well circumscribed to a specific area and because damage to an area can have consequences for computations in other brain regions. In addition, factors that are not region specific may be required to account for category-specific deficits in patients with nonfocal damage. In the following sections, we describe analyses of a number of factors that have been invoked to account for differential susceptibility.
Factor 2: Distinguishing Among Concepts

Distinguishing Features
Distinguishing features correspond to the aspects of people's knowledge that discriminate among concepts in general or among sets of similar concepts. For example, ϽmoosϾ distinguishes cows from other large four-legged animals (and in this case, from among all other things), whereas ϽeatsϾ does not because many things eat. Distinguishing features play a role in accounting for a number of primary empirical phenomena regarding normal participants' performance in semantic tasks, such as typicality judgments (Rosch & Mervis, 1975) , similarity judgments (Tversky, 1977) , and category verification (Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974) .
Distinguishing features may be crucial to understanding category-specific semantic deficits because many tasks used to establish the existence of such deficits, such as picture naming, word-to-picture matching, defining, and naming from definition, require distinguishing a specific concept from among similar concepts. For example, a patient can identify something as a zebra rather than a horse only if he or she has preserved knowledge of the features that distinguish them. Given the probabilistic nature of brain damage, the likelihood that a patient can discriminate a concept from among similar concepts may be related to the number or proportion of that concept's features that are distinguishing (Gonnerman et al., 1997) .
We investigated whether the proportion of a concept's features that are distinguishing could account for trends in the patient data, including the seventh trend (prevalence). We calculated the percentage of a concept's features that are distinguishing, with a feature defined as distinguishing if it occurred in only one or two concepts in the norms (as established across all 541 concepts). The 34 categories were then sorted on the mean percentage of the exemplars' features that are distinguishing, from least likely to be impaired at the top to most likely to be impaired at the bottom. All sorts are presented in this fashion, from least susceptible at the top to most susceptible at the bottom. Table 2 shows that the creatures categories possess a low percentage of distinguishing features; the 12 creatures categories are among the 15 lowest ranked on this variable. The nonlivingthings categories, with the exception of gun, each possess a greater percentage of distinguishing features than any of the creatures or fruits/vegetables categories. In addition, the fruits/vegetables group between the creatures and nonliving things, with the exception of fruit, which has a lower percentage of distinguishing features than the other fruits/vegetables categories. Therefore, if it is assumed that feature knowledge is lost probabilistically, then all else being equal, the distinguishing knowledge of creatures will be lost before that of fruits/vegetables, which in turn are more susceptible than the nonliving things. The results also provide insight into Trends 5 and 6. In the cluster analyses, foods cluster with the fruits/vegetables. Thus, on the basis of knowledge type alone, it seems unlikely that foods would deviate from the fruits/vegetables in terms of impairment. However, if they did, the distinguishing features analysis suggests that foods would be relatively preserved because their exemplars tend to possess a greater percentage of distinguishing features. Interestingly, Hart et al. (1985) reported that foods can be spared when fruits/vegetables are relatively impaired, and the opposite result has not been reported. Furthermore, this analysis provides another reason why musical instruments might be impaired along with living things: They possess a relatively low proportion of distinguishing features compared with the nonliving things. In summary, distinguishing features capture the category-level trends.
Feature Distinctiveness
The dichotomy between distinguishing and nondistinguishing features is somewhat artificial because features fall on a continuum regarding the amount of information they provide about a concept's identity. For example, whereas ϽmoosϾ is highly distinguishing, Ͻlives on farmsϾ is only somewhat distinguishing, Ͻhas 4 legsϾ is even less distinguishing, and ϽeatsϾ is not very distinguishing at all. Therefore, concepts might differ not just in their proportion of distinguishing features but also, and possibly even differentially, in terms of the amount of distinguishing information provided by the set of features of which they are composed. A measure used to reflect this continuum is distinctiveness, also known as informativeness (Devlin et al., 1998; .
Distinctiveness has been defined in two ways in the categoryspecific literature. Devlin et al. (1998) defined it as the inverse of the number of concepts in which a feature appears. defined it in the same manner but limited the contrast set to concepts within a category. We prefer Devlin et al.'s definition because it is unclear to us if or exactly how the contrast set should be limited. Distinctiveness is nonlinear, meaning that the difference in distinctiveness for a feature appearing in one versus two concepts is larger than for a feature appearing in two versus three concepts, and so on. Thus, the measure captures the intuition that features occurring in relatively few concepts should be treated as more informative than those occurring in many concepts.
We calculated the distinctiveness of every feature in the norms (based on all 541 concepts) and then the mean feature distinctiveness for each concept. We next calculated the mean for each category across its exemplars and sorted the categories based on this value. The sort presented in Table 3 mirrors the distinguishing features sort (Table 2 ) quite closely. The tripartite distinction is preserved, with creatures having low mean distinctiveness, nonliving things high mean distinctiveness, and fruits/vegetables falling in the middle. Foods have high mean distinctiveness and thus cluster with the nonliving things again. Musical instruments are found near the bottom of the nonliving things, just above the fruits/vegetables and creatures, again providing insight into why they may pattern with the living things in cases of impairment.
Note that we also sorted the categories on mean cue validity of the features of each category's exemplars. Cue validity is similar to distinctiveness but includes an estimate of feature salience. Cue validity of a feature for a specific concept was calculated as its production frequency for that concept (number of participants out of 30 who listed the feature for the concept) divided by the sum of the feature's production frequencies for all concepts in the set of 541. The sort mirrored both the distinguishing features and distinctiveness sorts.
In summary, given probabilistic damage, the likelihood of correctly responding on a typical task used to establish categoryspecific semantic deficits is related to the likelihood that the knowledge that distinguishes among similar concepts is preserved. Analyses based on distinguishing features and feature distinctiveness group the relevant sets of categories in a manner that follows the patient data.
Factor 3: Similarity A common way of thinking about semantic representations is as points in a multidimensional state space in which the dimensions are defined by features. Concept similarity is reflected in the proximity of the points (or attractor basins) that correspond to the concepts. Similarity is related to the distinctiveness of a concept's features because, overall, the less distinctive the features, the more similar the concepts must be to one another and the closer they are in state space. Semantic similarity has played an important role in many cognitive theories. For example, the distance of items from one another in state space can determine how participants parse novel concepts into new categories and how easily a predetermined category structure is learned (Kruschke, 1992) . It is also related to category verification latency (Smith et al., 1974) and the magnitude of short stimulus onset asynchrony semantic priming effects (Cree, McRae, & McNorgan, 1999) . Most important for the present discussion, variability in the density of regions of semantic space has served as the basis of several of the most influential theories of category-specific semantic deficits, including the OUCH and the cascade processing model of visual object recognition (Humphreys et al., 1988) . Visual similarity has played a particularly important role because picture naming and word-picture matching are the most commonly used diagnostic tasks.
Visual Similarity
The time it takes to classify, name, or perform an object decision about a visually presented object is related to the density of the visual neighborhood of that object. For example, unimpaired participants were faster to make domain-level classifications (living/ nonliving) of pictures of objects from categories with structurally similar exemplars (e.g., birds, insects, fruits, and vegetables) than from categories with dissimilar exemplars (e.g., clothing and furniture; Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987) . The opposite pattern has been found when participants were asked to name objects (Humphreys et al., 1988) or make object decisions (Lloyd-Jones & . These seemingly contradictory results arose because of the different types of information that are necessary for performing these tasks (see Humphreys et al., 1988; Humphreys, Lamote, & Lloyd-Jones, 1995; Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987 , for further discussion). Thus, any evidence suggesting that categories differ systematically in terms of the visual similarity of each exemplar's nearest neighbors might provide insight into the behavioral trends.
Both subjective and objective measures have provided evidence that living things tend to have more visually similar neighbors than do nonliving things. When participants rated pairwise visual similarity of a set of pictures, living things were judged more structurally similar (Humphreys, Lloyd-Jones, & Fias, 1995; Sartori, Job, Miozzo, Zago, & Marchiori, 1993) . Corresponding results have been obtained using objective measures such as contour overlap of standardized pictures (Humphreys et al., 1988) or image overlap of standardized pictures (Tranel, Logan, et al., 1997) . Tranel, Logan, et al. (1997) reported significant variability between categories when they measured visual similarity as the common subcategory silhouette of line drawings of objects, with fruits/vegetables being the most similar, followed by vehicles, animals, and musical instruments, followed by tools and utensils. When Humphreys et al. (1988) asked participants to list the parts of objects, living things had more shared parts than nonliving things. Finally, monkeys trained to discriminate among standardized line drawings of living and nonliving things took longer to learn the living things, presumably because they are more difficult to discriminate (Gaffan & Heywood, 1993) .
Given the role of visual similarity in accounts of categoryspecific deficits, we tested whether a measure of visual similarity derived from the feature norms would provide insight into the seven trends. Claims about the role of visual similarity have focused on structural descriptions of objects, the kind of visual information that is necessary for computations that occur after initial retinal and early visual processing of objects and that allow for stable, viewpoint-invariant object representations to be computed. Because this kind of information is typically thought to map onto contours and parts, we included only the features that fell into the visual-parts and surface properties and visual-color knowledge types in the brain region taxonomy. Only two concepts, cake and toy, did not have any of these knowledge types and were excluded from the analysis. To derive a measure of density for each exemplar, we calculated the mean proximity of the four closest concepts (regardless of category) to each exemplar by computing the cosine of the angle between the visual feature vectors of each concept pair and selecting the four closest. Each feature was represented by its production frequency in this calculation, rather than being binary. We then calculated the mean of these values for each category. Table 4 shows a slight overall tendency for the closest visual neighbors of exemplars from the creatures and fruits/vegetables categories to be more proximal than those of the nonliving-things categories. Although the visual similarity measure roughly captures differences among categories, it does not appear to be sensitive enough to provide insight into the seven trends. It perhaps is not surprising that a measure of visual structural similarity derived from verbal semantic feature production norms did not fare well in providing insight into the trends. Although the norms do contain a sizeable number of visual features that correlate with visual structure (e.g., Ͻhas a handleϾ correlates with the presence of long, protruding appendages), they fail to capture some of the kinds of visual information that intuitively seem important for visual similarity judgments (e.g., contour overlap, similarity in patterns of shading, spatial relations among parts). Measures based on contour and pixel overlap of line drawings may provide a better approximation of visual similarity (see Laws & Gale, 2002, and Riddoch, 2002 , for discussion). Other promising approaches for assessing visual similarity include forced choice from among a set of pictures of category exemplars following a very briefly displayed (e.g., 15 ms) and masked presentation of a category exemplar (Bukach, Bub, Masson, & Lindsay, 2002) .
On the other hand, the results could be interpreted as demonstrating that visual similarity plays a less important role in discriminating among categories than has previously been thought. Tranel, Logan, et al. (1997) also found only small differences between animals/birds, fruits/vegetables, tools/utensils, vehicles, and musical instruments when they had participants rate the visual ambiguity of items in terms of the size of the class of entities that are visually similar, yet distinct, from the target items. Perhaps more troubling, Laws and Gale (2002) claimed that visual similarity measures that consider only contour overlap are underrepresentative of true visual similarity because they ignore detail within the contours of drawings. When this additional information was considered, they found that nonliving things were more visually similar to one another than were living things. Clearly, further work is necessary to determine the aspects of visual representations used in computing visual similarity.
Semantic Similarity
It is difficult to separate visual and semantic similarity because many visual features are correlated with semantic features and there exists strong evidence for top-down influences of semantic similarity on visual processing. Humphreys et al. (1988) , for example, reported that J.B. was impaired in a word-picture matching test only when the distractors were visually and semantically similar to the target (as rated on a 7-point Likert scale by unimpaired participants) but performed normally when distractors were visually and semantically dissimilar and when they were visually dissimilar but semantically related to the target. Similarly, Dixon et al. (1997) have demonstrated effects of semantic similarity on perceptual tasks in E.L.M.'s performance. Their psychological distance theory proposes that object representations exist in a space defined by both visual and semantic dimensions (Schweizer, Dixon, Westwood, & Piskopos, 2001) . Thus, musical instruments that share shape, action/manner, sound, and other types of features (e.g., guitar, cello, and violin) will be closer together in space than machines that are distinguished by their shapes and functions (e.g., blender, projector, and typewriter). In addition, models in which visual and semantic information resides in separate representational layers allow for reentrant activation from semantic layers back to visual layers during processing . In support of the interaction between visual and other types of knowledge, Dixon et al. have demonstrated an influence of semantic similarity on visual tasks in unimpaired adults.
Little empirical evidence has been provided for the role of semantic similarity in theories of category-specific semantic deficits because it is difficult to derive a measure of semantic similarity for a large number of concepts. Semantic similarity has typically been measured subjectively by having participants rate pairwise similarity of a set of concepts when presented with the concepts' names. In contrast, we derived a measure of semantic similarity directly from the feature norms by defining semantic similarity as the cosine of the angle between two feature vector representations (including production frequency information). As in the visual similarity analysis, we next calculated the mean similarity of the four closest semantic neighbors to each concept to provide a measure of potential confusability and then sorted the categories.
In Table 5 , 12 of the 15 categories composed of exemplars having the least similar neighbors are nonliving things (furniture, utensil, weapon, and gun are the exceptions). Fruit, vegetable, and plant are interspersed within the creatures whereas root/tuber groups with the nonliving things, having few semantically similar neighbors. The musical instruments group with the creatures near the bottom because they tend to have highly semantically similar neighbors and thus would easily be confused with one another, providing a further reason why they might pattern with creatures in terms of deficits. Foods again are found with the nonliving-things categories, providing further insight into why foods may be spared in cases of fruits/vegetables deficits. We found similar results in analyses of the mean distance of the closest one, two, and three concepts, as well as analyses of the mean number of concepts within various distances from a target concept. In summary, the semantic similarity analysis accounts for several of the trends but does not clearly explain the tripartite distinction, providing some support for theories of category-specific deficits that emphasize the importance of semantic similarity.
Why did this analysis fail to provide insight into the tripartite distinction, whereas the two knowledge-type analyses, which were also based on similarity, were successful? We believe that it has to do with the levels at which the two types of analyses were conducted. The knowledge-type analyses ignore differences across category exemplars in the specific features of which they are composed; only the type of feature matters. Stated another way, the semantic similarity analysis is working in a 2,526-dimensional space, whereas the cluster analyses are working in 9-or 22-dimensional spaces. We believe that it is at this more general knowledge-type level that the most unique insights into categoryspecific deficits are most likely to be found.
Factor 4: Visual Complexity
Because visual complexity is thought to influence picturenaming accuracy and latency, when researchers have designed sets of pictures for experiments, they often have collected measures of it. For example, Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) collected visual complexity ratings (the amount of detail or intricacy of line in the picture) for their 260 black-and-white line drawings of common objects by asking participants to rate them on a scale of 1-5, in which 1 indicated very simple and 5 indicated very complex. A sort of the 12 main categories to which the concepts belong revealed three distinct groups, with kitchen utensils, fruits, carpenter's tools, human body parts, clothing, and furniture being on average the least visually complex; vegetables being of medium visual complexity; and vehicles, birds, animals, musical instruments, and insects being of high visual complexity. Given these differences in visual complexity across categories, the need to control it across stimulus groups has often been noted (Funnell & Sheridan, 1992; Stewart, Parkin, & Hunkin, 1992) . One way in which visual complexity could influence naming accuracy and latency is through its effect on initial object recognition. It has been hypothesized that more visually complex stimuli should take longer to recognize because more information must be parsed from the stimulus. To support this claim, Montanes, Goldblum, and Boller (1995) reported that items of high visual complexity were named less accurately by both Alzheimer's disease patients and controls, and in addition, Ellis and Morrison (1998) have shown that visual complexity influenced picture-naming latencies in unimpaired participants. However, visual complexity has not always been found to contribute uniquely to naming latencies in unimpaired participants (Bonin, Chalard, Meot, & Fayol, 2002; Kremin, Hamerel, Dordain, De Wilde, & Perrier, 2000) , and furthermore, visual complexity appears to have little influence on naming accuracy in cases of semantic dementia (Lambon Ralph, Graham, Ellis, & Hodges, 1998) and naming latencies in cases of aphasia (Laiacona, Luzzatti, Zonca, Guarnaschelli, & Capitani, 2001; Nickels & Howard, 1995) . These inconsistent results may be attributed to a number of factors, including the range of the visual complexity in any one study and the manner in which visual complexity is measured.
It has also been proposed that visual complexity, or amount of object detail, could influence patients' ability to integrate a picture's components into a coherent nameable object (Arguin, Bub, & Dudeck, 1996; ). In a picture-naming task, for example, the patient must decompose the picture and pull out the information (e.g., parts, colors) that is critical for identifying the depicted object and distinguishing it from other visually similar objects. Pictures composed of many parts and visual properties could be problematic for patients who have difficulty integrating across visual dimensions. In short, there are a number of ways in which visual complexity could influence performance in the tasks typically used to test for semantic impairments.
To test whether our 34 categories differed on visual complexity, we derived a measure of visual complexity from the norms by counting the number of visual external components and external surface properties (WB feature types) for each concept. That is, we removed all encyclopedic, tactile, smell, and sound features from these two knowledge types and examined only the visual external parts and properties, essentially retaining only those features from these two knowledge types that belonged to the visual-color and visual-parts and surface properties in the brain region analysis. We then sorted the 34 categories on the mean number of external visual features. Although the visual similarity analyses failed using similar information, we believe this is a valid and interesting way of capturing visual complexity because the measure is quite general, not being influenced by artists' renditions of objects, and the feature norming participants were not distracted by irrelevant surface details that an artist might add to a drawing. Table 6 shows that the creatures, with the exception of fish, group at the bottom, having the most visual external components and surface properties, whereas the nonliving things group at the top, having the fewest, suggesting another reason why creatures impairments are more prevalent than nonliving-things impairments. Fruits/vegetables are scattered throughout the middle, although they group primarily within the nonliving things. Foods are at the top with the nonliving things. Interestingly, musical instruments group with the nonliving things, providing additional evidence as to why they might not always pattern with the creatures in terms of impairment. Given the close relationship of the features used in this analysis to the external components and external surface properties in the WB knowledge-types analyses and the patterning of the domains and test cases observed in the relevant cone diagrams in Figures 3C and 3F , these findings may be viewed as quite interesting because they highlight the ability of theoreti- cally motivated conjunctions of factors-in this case, two knowledge types-to contribute to an understanding of category-specific deficits. Finally, these findings accord with similar analyses conducted with smaller sets of items (Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980) and provide further evidence that visual complexity should be controlled when designing experiments.
Factor 5: Concept Familiarity
Familiarity is a ubiquitous factor in psychology. With respect to semantic memory, increased experience with a concept's referents leads to a more robust representation. The process through which this occurs can be explained by numerous models. For example, following the principles of Hebbian learning, the more often a pattern is processed, the stronger the connections among its constituent representational elements become (Hebb, 1949) . In the study of category-specific semantic deficits, familiarity has most often been relegated to the role of a nuisance variable. Funnell and Sheridan (1992) and Stewart et al. (1992) pointed out that living things are generally less familiar than nonliving things and that therefore, it is more likely that one would find a living-things deficit if familiarity influences processing and items are selected randomly from these domains. When the factors contributing to deficits have been examined post hoc, it has repeatedly been found that concept familiarity is a strong predictor of preservation of knowledge (Farah et al., 1996; Lambon Ralph, Graham, et al., 1998) . In addition, when Funnell and de Mornay-Davies (1996) retested J.B.R. (Warrington & Shallice, 1984) , they found that although the living-things deficit remained, it was the lowfamiliarity living-things items that were giving J.B.R. the most difficulty, with no difference in impairment between highfamiliarity living and nonliving things.
We tested the prediction that familiar concepts would be more likely to be preserved in the face of damage. Twenty participants rated their familiarity with our concepts ("How familiar are you with the thing the word refers to?") on a scale of 1-9, with 1 corresponding to not at all familiar and 9 corresponding to highly familiar. We then sorted the 34 categories on mean concept familiarity. Table 7 shows that with regard to the tripartite distinction, creatures are generally less familiar than nonliving things and fruits/vegetables are more familiar than the creatures, embedded within the nonliving things. Furthermore, foods are highly familiar, again grouping with the nonliving things, providing further support for why foods may tend to be preserved when fruits/ vegetables knowledge is lost. Finally, musical instruments tend to be unfamiliar, reflecting the fact that most people do not come into direct contact with them in their daily lives. This provides support for why musical instruments may be impaired along with creatures. Finally, gun is the least familiar of all categories, suggesting that although it diverged from the other nonliving things in the brain region cluster analysis due to their highly salient sounds, it would probably not serve as a good test category because most people do not have extensive direct experience with its exemplars (note that the familiarity ratings were collected in Canada). In summary, familiarity provides insight into the six major trends in patterns of impairment, as well as the seventh trend in that creatures are less familiar than nonliving things and therefore are more likely to be impaired. However, fruits/vegetables are more familiar than the creatures, which may be one reason why fruits/vegetables can be spared when knowledge about creatures is lost.
Factor 6: Word Frequency Word frequency can be viewed as a mixture of indices of name and concept familiarity. The frequency with which a word is encountered influences how quickly and easily that word can be recognized and produced (Duncan, 1977; Forster & Chambers, 1973; McRae, Jared, & Seidenberg, 1990 ). Word frequency is important for category-specific deficits because most tasks used to probe for such deficits require either producing or recognizing the name of a picture or object. The more often the name has been encountered and produced, then, all else being equal, the easier it should be to produce it or to match it to a picture. In addition, the more frequently a word is read or heard, the more frequently the conceptual representation of the entity is computed. Therefore, word frequency presumably influences how easily the meaning of a word can be computed.
We collected word frequency counts for the concept names using the British National Corpus online search engine (Burnard, 2000) , which accesses a 100,000,000-word body of written and spoken language designed to capture a broad spectrum of language usage. Frequency counts for the singular and plural forms of each concept name were summed. The natural logarithm of the word frequency (ln[word frequency]) was used to control for outliers, as is standard in studies of word frequency (Zipf, 1932) . Mean ln[word frequency] was computed for each category, and the categories were sorted. Table 8 shows that although the word frequency counts were derived from a different source than the familiarity scores, the results of the two sorts are similar. With the exception of guns, the creatures and nonliving things are separated entirely. Foods again group with the nonliving things and musical instruments with the living things.
In contrast to the familiarity sort, fruits/vegetables group with the creatures rather than the nonliving things in terms of name frequency. This occurs presumably because people interact with fruits/vegetables every day but their names do not show up a great deal in the sorts of materials found in text corpora. This difference between the familiarity and word frequency of fruits/vegetables may explain an interesting aspect of fruits/vegetables deficits. Two cases of specific naming deficits for fruits/vegetables have been reported in which patients demonstrated preserved knowledge about fruits/vegetables but a profound difficulty in naming them (Farah & Wallace, 1992; Hart et al., 1985) . This could have occurred because fruits/vegetables are highly familiar on average, whereas their names are not. In addition, the ln[word frequency] of the category labels fruit(s) (8.5) and vegetable(s) (7.9) is high, indicating that they are available as alternative labels (it is scored as an error if a patient responds with one of these labels).
Factor 7: Correlated Features
Correlations among features are viewed as central to semantic organization (Malt & Smith, 1984; Rosch, 1978; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976) . Features are said to be correlated if they tend to occur together in the same basic-level concepts. For example, the features ϽfliesϾ and Ͻhas feathersϾ are correlated because they occur together in almost all birds. Rosch (1978) claimed that pockets of correlated features serve as the foundation upon which conceptual representations are formed, and Rosch et al. (1976) claimed that the basic level of conceptual representation (e.g., dog, cat) corresponds to the level at which feature correlations best cohere within categories and can be used to distinguish among them. Feature correlations have been hypothesized to play a role in explaining patterns of category-specific deficits observed in cases of semantic impairment due to progressive diseases such as dementia of the Alzheimer type. Specifically, they are thought to preserve conceptual representations in cases of mild damage but to render those same representations inaccessible in cases of moderate to severe damage (Devlin et al., 1998; Gonnerman et al., 1997) . This interaction is predicted from examining the weights that form between correlated versus noncorrelated features in connectionist models. In such models, groups of correlated features tend to develop strong weights among one another because the presence of one typically indicates the presence of the others. During processing, these weights allow activation to accrue faster in these features than in noncorrelated features, all else being equal. In these models, brain damage typically is simulated by removing connections between features. In cases of mild brain damage, only a small number of connections between features are removed, and therefore, the remaining, strong connections between correlated features allow these features to activate one another and preserve access to them relative to other features. However, in cases of moderate to severe damage, when sufficient numbers of connections have been lost, the reinforcing effect no longer operates, and entire clumps of correlated features are lost, effectively destroying the representations of which they are a part. It has been claimed that living things tend to cohere around clusters of intercorrelated features more so than do nonliving things (Devlin et al., 1998; Gelman, 1988; Keil, 1989; McRae et al., 1997) . Because the nature of a patient's category-specific deficit typically is tested only after the presence of a semantic deficit has been observed, most patients with progressive impairments are tested only after their damage has reached at least a moderate stage, and therefore, living-things deficits are predicted to be more likely than nonliving-things deficits (Devlin et al., 1998) .
To test whether feature correlations differed by category, we sorted the 34 categories on the mean percentage of their exemplars' feature pairs that are correlated from least to most likely to be impaired in moderate to severe progressive damage. The most noticeable aspect of Table 9 is the large amount of variation within each domain, so that the sets do not group cleanly. Perhaps the only stable finding is that fruits/vegetables are dense in correlated feature pairs. The musical instruments and foods fall in the middle of the sort, providing little insight into why these categories should pattern with either living or nonliving things. In summary, we found little, if any, evidence to suggest that the domains differ systematically in terms of the percentage of correlated features of which their exemplars are composed, suggesting that correlations among features may not serve as a major organizational factor of semantic memory.
We have previously demonstrated that feature correlations are important for semantic computations in unimpaired populations (McRae et al., 1997 . For example, in a speeded featureverification task, participants were faster to verify that a feature was part of a concept if the feature was strongly intercorrelated with the other features of the concept versus weakly intercorrelated with them. Therefore, although the influence of feature correlations is evident when testing knowledge at the featural level, it does not provide insight into the category-level trends.
Summary: Susceptibility to Impairment
The susceptibility factors provide insight into the trends in impairment. Creatures pattern separately from nonliving things on all susceptibility factors except the visual similarity and correlated features. However, with regard to visual similarity, several researchers who have tapped visual similarity using analyses of pictures or drawings have separated the domains on this variable. The fruits/vegetables tend to group together, residing sometimes between the creatures and the nonliving things (distinguishing features and feature distinctiveness), sometimes with the creatures (concept similarity and word frequency), and sometimes with the nonliving things (visual complexity and concept familiarity). Foods group consistently with the nonliving things. In contrast, musical instruments either group with the creatures (distinguishing features, concept similarity, concept familiarity, and word frequency) or sit near the junction of the creatures, fruits/vegetables, and nonliving things (feature distinctiveness). The one exception is visual complexity, on which musical instruments group with the nonliving things. Therefore, taken together, the susceptibility factors correctly suggest that creatures impairments should be more frequent than nonliving-things impairments, that knowledge about musical instruments should often be impaired when knowledge about living things is impaired, that fruits/vegetables impairments should be variable, and that foods may be preserved when fruits/ vegetables are impaired. Given these eight susceptibility factors, one issue that arises concerns the degree to which they measure independent aspects of semantic representation. To address this issue statistically, we calculated correlations among the susceptibility factors, and these are presented in Table 10 . The correlations were calculated across all 538 concepts that were included in at least one of the 34 categories. Because of the large number of cases (df ϭ 536), all correlation coefficients presented in Table 10 are significant (although many are rather small, Ϫ0.3 Ͻ r Ͻ 0.3). There are a few results of note. As expected, the two feature informativeness measures (distinguishing features and distinctiveness) are highly correlated and thus provide essentially the same information. This is comforting because the criterion of designating a feature as distinguishing was somewhat arbitrary. Furthermore, semantic similarity has relatively high negative correlations with the informativeness measures, although the sort based on it did not mirror the trends as closely. The informativeness measures are dominated by features that occur in very few concepts, and these features presumably play an important role in differentiating among basiclevel concepts and thus being able to recognize, name, or provide unique information about them. The fact that these measures best mirror the behavioral trends implies that preserved computation of these features is critical to patients' performance. At the other end of the spectrum, visual complexity, which reflects the degree of difficulty in visually parsing objects or pictures of them, is relatively independent of the other measures, and the sort based on it captured the behavioral trends reasonably well. Percentage of correlated feature pairs is also relatively independent, although it failed to provide insight into the behavioral trends. Finally, concept familiarity and concept name frequency are also relatively independent of all other measures and are only moderately correlated with one another. Therefore, given that both measures provided insight into the trends in impairment, they appear to provide useful information that is relatively independent of the other measures. The fact that they provide somewhat different insight, particularly in terms of fruits/vegetables deficits, has been discussed above.
Combining the Factors
The final question we address is whether one can gain a better understanding of how the factors converge to produce the trends in impairment by simultaneously analyzing the brain region knowledge type and susceptibility factors. We conducted a cluster analysis using the same procedures as in the previous two cluster analyses. We included only one feature informativeness measure, distinguishing features, because the strong correlation between it and feature distinctiveness suggests that they index the same underlying factor. Thus, we analyzed a 34 (category) ϫ 16 (variable) matrix, in which each knowledge type and susceptibility factor counts as a separate variable. To control for scaling differences, we rescaled the scores of each variable to range between 0 and 1 (rescaled score ϭ (score Ϫ min.)/(max. Ϫ min.)). Figure 6 shows a clear replication of the major findings presented in the previous cluster analyses. Creatures, fruits/vegetables, and nonliving things each form distinguishable clusters. Foods cluster with the fruits/vegetables, and then, this entire cluster groups with the nonliving things. The only notable difference from the knowledge-type cluster analyses is that the musical instruments no longer cluster with the nonliving things, instead forming their own cluster that includes guns and weapons.
To interpret this solution and to explore groupwise relations among variables, we conducted a principal components analysis. Examination of the varimax-rotated component matrix presented in Table 11 reveals four principal components that account for 77% of the total variance. We used this matrix in conjunction with the component score matrix to interpret the components. Component 1 has high positive loadings on visual-motion and visual complexity and high negative loadings on distinguishing features, concept familiarity, concept name frequency, and functions. Therefore, it can be interpreted as discriminating between creatures and nonliving things. Component 2 has high positive loadings on sound, visual similarity, and semantic similarity and high negative loadings on distinguishing features, concept familiarity, and concept name frequency. In the component score matrix, musical instruments and guns have the highest positive scores on Component 2, both having highly salient sounds, whereas buildings, miscellaneous nonliving things, shelters, houses, and foods have the lowest scores, all of which are particularly high in distinguishing features and concept name frequency. We interpreted Component 2 as being responsible for producing the musical instruments, guns, and weapons cluster. Component 3 has high positive loadings on the tactile, visual-color, and taste knowledge types and a high negative loading on visual-parts and surface properties. The component score matrix reveals that Component 3 primarily distinguishes the fruits/vegetables and foods from the other categories, thus explaining why they form a unique cluster. Finally, Component 4 has high positive loadings on smell, correlated features, encyclopedic knowledge, and taste but high negative loadings on visual-parts and surface properties. The component score matrix reveals that fish, building, and foods have the highest scores on it, whereas musical instruments have the second lowest score, distinguishing them all from other members of their domains and thus providing insight into why all three categories join their respective clusters at a late stage. Consistent with this interpretation, fish and building are the two categories highest in correlated features, fish and foods are high in smell and taste information, and fish has few encyclopedic features.
In conclusion, these analyses highlight the relations among the knowledge types and susceptibility factors and demarcate their contribution to explaining the trends in impairment. All 16 variables contributed uniquely to the solution, yet the analyses clearly point out which factors are most important for producing each trend. It is somewhat remarkable that when all of the variables were included in a single hierarchical cluster analysis, the solution fit well with the trends in impairment. Moreover, including all variables in a single analysis moves us one step closer to understanding how the factors would interact in a complex, interactive system. However, to gain a full understanding of the relations among the factors, it would be necessary to implement a computational model that integrates all of the factors.
On the basis of all the analyses, we can make tentative predictions concerning which knowledge types would need to be damaged to produce domain-level deficits. For creatures, visualmotion, visual-parts and surface properties, and encyclopedic features are particularly salient. For nonliving things, function, visual-parts and surface properties, and encyclopedic features are important. For fruits/vegetables, function, visual-parts and surface properties, visual-color, taste, tactile, and encyclopedic features are salient. Extracting the knowledge types that discriminate among domains, visual-motion information is important only for creatures, functional information is important only for nonliving things and fruits/vegetables, and visual-color, taste, and tactile information is important only for fruits/vegetables. On the basis of this evidence, one might be tempted to conclude that if a patient were found for whom one of these groups of knowledge types was impaired, he or she would be expected to present with the corresponding domain-level deficit. However, the susceptibility analyses and combined analyses suggest that making such predictions may be premature. Although the salience of a knowledge type can point in the right direction, it is necessary to examine how all variables interact in a dynamic, interactive system before firm predictions can be derived. Similar concerns motivated Farah and McClelland (1991) to implement the sensory/functional theory in a computational model. Extensions of existing connectionist models Devlin et al., 1998; Hinton & Shallice, 1991; McRae et al., 1997; Rogers & McClelland, in press) , in which semantic memory would be instantiated across pools of knowledge types instead of homogeneous semantic layers, should prove to be a valuable avenue for future research in this domain. Note that these types of models are sensitive to all of the susceptibility factors given appropriate architectures and training regions, enabling simultaneous influences of the critical variables.
General Discussion
Our primary hypothesis was that for the regularities in patterns of deficits to exist as they do despite the numerous sources of variability in the testing of patients with category-specific deficits, a number of factors regarding the organization and computation of the meaning of concrete nouns must converge to produce them.
The major contributions of this article stem from the fact that our large set of feature norms enabled testing the efficacy of the factors in a manner that is much more detailed than in any previous research. We have presented evidence supporting knowledge types when expanded from existing binary distinctions, the degree to which features are informative about a concept's identity (measured as distinguishing features and feature distinctiveness), concept similarity, visual complexity, concept familiarity, and word frequency. Visual similarity and correlations among features were not supported. On the basis of this empirical evidence, we have argued that a multifactor theory of the structure and computation of concrete noun concepts is capable of accounting for the primary behavioral phenomena concerning category-specific semantic deficits. We now elaborate on this conclusion, engaging currently unresolved debates, to argue for the stronger conclusion that a multifactor account is necessary to explain the full spectrum of deficits.
The Necessity of Knowledge Types
A central claim of any knowledge-type theory is that the relevant sets of categories differ systematically in terms of the salience of the knowledge types of which their exemplars are composed. Given our analyses, particularly the brain regions cluster analysis, as well as evidence from recent related articles McRae & Cree, 2002) , we believe that overwhelming evidence now supports the validity of this claim.
It has repeatedly been argued that because the sensory/functional theory is incapable of accounting for the tripartite distinction, a knowledge-type theory therefore is inadequate as a theory of semantic organization (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Mahon & Caramazza, 2001; Santos & Caramazza 2002; Shelton & Caramazza, 1999) . At the heart of this argument is the claim that the sensory/functional theory contains insufficient degrees of freedom to account for the data. Given the cases that have been reported since the sensory/functional theory was first introduced, we concur with the inadequacies of the sensory/functional theory. However, we disagree that this argument can be extended to encompass all knowledge-type theories. Our cluster analyses serve as strong evidence that knowledge-type theories can account for the patterns of impairment. Furthermore, the susceptibility factors show that it is not essential for a knowledge-type theory to explain all relevant behavioral phenomena because there are other factors that contribute to explaining specific components of the patterns of deficits. Along similar lines, it has been argued that knowledge-type theories fail to explain category-specific deficits in cases of nonfocal damage. Thus, it has been suggested that there must be other variables at work, such as feature correlations and feature distinctiveness (Devlin et al., 1998; Gonnerman et al., 1997) . Our multifactor account makes predictions regarding patients with nonfocal damage. First, Garrard, Lambon Ralph, Watson, et al. (2001) discussed evidence suggesting that some brain regions typically are targeted by dementia of the Alzheimer type before others, thus raising the possibility that damage to specific knowledge types could underlie the deficits of some Alzheimer's disease patients. Specifically, the areas involved in visual object processing usually are affected prior to the areas involved in processing functional information, although this can vary by patient. Therefore, on the basis of knowledge types, living-things deficits might be expected to be found more often than nonliving-things deficits in these patients. If, however, some cases are indeed truly nonfocal, then an account most likely depends on other factors. When the susceptibility factors are considered, the prediction is obvious: If nonfocal patients show category-specific deficits, they should virtually always be deficits to creatures rather than to nonliving things. The data currently support this prediction (Garrard, Lambon Ralph, Watson, et al., 2001) .
If the susceptibility factors can explain how category-specific semantic deficits might arise from nonfocal damage, perhaps they are sufficient to account for all cases (Tyler & Moss, 2001 ). Contrary to this proposal, our analyses suggest that knowledge types are necessary to account for nonliving-things deficits. Our analyses as a whole correctly predict that nonliving-things deficits should be much less prevalent than living-things deficits (where living things usually include a combination of creatures and fruits/ vegetables). On the other hand, nonliving-things deficits do exist. Therefore, given that the susceptibility factors suggest that nonliving things are the least susceptible, this strongly suggests that nonliving-things deficits are indeed tied to specific types of knowledge and thus that knowledge types are necessary to account for the full spectrum of deficits.
Living-Things Deficits Do Not Necessarily Imply Deficits to Perceptual Knowledge
It has often been claimed that a central prediction that can be derived from the sensory/functional theory is that there should be a correlation between impaired categories and impaired types of knowledge (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998) . In other words, if sensory knowledge is particularly salient for living things and functional knowledge for nonliving things and if category-specific deficits are due to damage to modality-specific processing channels, then when a patient presents with a deficit in one of the two domains, he or she should also experience difficulty in accessing the type of knowledge that is purported to underlie the deficit. Thus, living-things deficit patients should have trouble computing visual knowledge about both living and nonliving things, and the same should apply for functional knowledge in cases of nonlivingthings deficits. Supporting these claims, cases of general deficits to visual knowledge for both living and nonliving things have been reported (Forde, Francis, Riddoch, Rumiati, & Humphreys, 1997; Humphreys Riddoch, & Price, 1997; Silveri & Gamotti, 1988) . However, the data are not clear. Both living-things and sensoryknowledge deficits have been reported in isolation (Laiacona, Barbarotto, & Capitani, 1993) . Patient E.W. (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998 ) had a creatures deficit and was found to be equally impaired on visual and functional knowledge. Patient S.E. (Laws, Evans, Hodges, & McCarthy, 1995) had a living-things deficit with poor associative knowledge. Patient I.W. (Lambon Ralph, Howard, Nightingale, & Ellis, 1998 ) had a deficit in visual knowledge but spared living-things knowledge. In addition, patients with deficits in naming the color of objects do not necessarily have fruits/vegetables deficits (Luzzatti & Davidoff, 1994; Miceli et al., 2001) . The inconsistency in obtaining the predicted correlations between concept domain and knowledge type has been interpreted as evidence against the sensory/functional theory and, by extrapolation, all knowledge-type theories.
In contrast, our susceptibility analyses clearly show that there are a number of ways that living-things deficits, and creatures deficits in particular, might arise. Our analyses demonstrate that living-things deficits do not necessarily have to be accompanied by impairments to visual sensory knowledge. Therefore, interpreting the source of living-things deficits may demand data concerning the precise location of brain damage. It is highly likely, given current understanding of the location of damage in many livingthings deficits patients, that the damage includes, but may not be limited to, visual and other multimodal sensory integration areas. The point we wish to highlight, however, is that if the damage is in an area that encodes information important to all categories, such as visual information, or if damage is not restricted to a circumscribed area, then the susceptibility factors may conspire to produce a creatures (or living-things) deficit. Therefore, the susceptibility factors could produce a living-things deficit even though damage to visual knowledge is such that no marked deficit in specific visual knowledge is evidenced in tests of feature-level knowledge.
There are further reasons why the evidence regarding correlations between knowledge types and type of impairment must be interpreted with caution. Several researchers have claimed that items used in these tests have not been equated adequately for knowledge type, difficulty of knowledge, or a myriad of other factors that must be considered when testing at the level of features (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Cree & McRae, 2001; ). These factors include concept familiarity, feature informativeness, and other measures of feature saliency and type. Constrained by the sensory/functional hypothesis, researchers have often treated all types of sensory knowledge as equivalent, comparing, for example, questions about the parts of living things with the colors of nonliving things, as though these knowledge types were a priori equally salient and accessible. Likewise, to test residual functional knowledge, researchers have been forced to extend the meaning of the term functional to devise questions about living things (e.g., "Does a squirrel climb trees?"). Thus, knowledge about how people use nonliving things has been compared with entity behaviors or visual motion features of living things. Unfortunately, because most articles do not include their items, it is impossible to use the feature norms to evaluate fully the validity of the available evidence. When we consider all of these problems together, we conclude that the data necessary to resolve this debate remain to be collected. We hope that our feature norms will serve as a valuable tool in this regard.
Do Highly Distributed, Highly Overlapping Representations Imply Amodal Semantics?
A final argument regarding knowledge types concerns the validity of the neuroimaging evidence supporting modality-specific semantic processing regions. Devlin et al. (2002) and Tyler and Moss (2001) claimed that the regions activated across studies by exemplars of particular categories are far from consistent and that the only consistent finding has been that tools activate the left posterior middle temporal gyrus (H. Damasio et al., 1996; Martin et al., 1996) . They argued that the discrepant findings can be attributed to a number of factors, including poorly controlled stimuli and task differences. Furthermore, they argued that studies claiming to find category-specific areas of activation may be reporting false positives that occur because of uncontrolled alpha levels across multiple voxel-level comparisons. In their own research, they found that living and nonliving things both activate an extensive network of neural areas, including left frontotemporal regions, with no category-level or domain-level differences (Devlin et al., 2002) , and therefore, they argued against the existence of modality-specific semantic processing regions. Devlin et al.'s, (2002) criticisms can be synthesized with modality-specific organization, however. Martin and Chao (2001;  see also Kiefer & Spitzer, 2001 ) recently reviewed a growing body of evidence supporting the claim that object representations are best characterized as complex patterns of peaks and valleys of activation in the ventral temporal and occipital cortex (Haxby et al., 2001) . Items from various object categories elicit maximal peaks of activity in regions of these distributed areas based on the particular visual features and semantic knowledge types of which they are composed. Furthermore, Martin and Chao reported that the arrangement of these peaks is consistent across subjects and tasks. As Devlin et al. pointed out, many of the studies on which their own meta-analysis was based used poorly controlled stimuli and almost certainly did not control for differences in knowledge types across categories. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that Devlin et al. failed to find areas of activation that can be consistently associated with specific categories. Differences in familiarity, imageability, visual complexity, and structural similarity in previous studies-and most importantly, knowledge types in their own studies-may have masked these differences. Therefore, although there is no doubt that vast distributed processing areas are, and should be, activated when concrete noun concepts are computed, the interesting question is whether some regions are activated differentially from others when processing stimuli controlled for the salience of different knowledge types (and other factors), not category.
"Category"-Specific Deficits?
A similar line of reasoning can be applied to all behavioral studies of category-specific semantic deficits. Although the study of patients exhibiting category-specific deficits has led researchers to look closely at the structure of concrete noun concepts to understand what may underlie these category-level differences, it is ironic that these studies may point to the conclusion that the deficits are not categorical in nature at all. Instead, what appear to be category-specific deficits may just be the result of tests that use category exemplars that group at various ends of the continua of possible scores on the factors discussed in this article (Tranel, Logan, et al., 1997 , reached a similar conclusion). Certainly, exception categories that do not pattern with their respective domains in terms of impairment, such as foods, musical instruments, and body parts, point to this conclusion.
The analyses presented herein highlight the variability across categories on the factors thought to structure semantic memory and influence computations. Our analyses show that category exemplars vary on these factors within sets of categories. Consider fish and insects. If a researcher were testing for residual creature knowledge, it would be unwise to use items from these two categories. Across susceptibility factors, fish and insects are at opposite ends of the range of scores within the domain of creatures on many of them and, most importantly, are not typical of creatures. Likewise, for nonliving things, it would be unwise to compare residual knowledge about vehicles and buildings, which not only vary on multiple susceptibility factors but also differ systematically across knowledge types (e.g., many vehicles have salient visual-motion features, whereas buildings do not). We believe that our analyses contribute to the growing body of work demonstrating the importance of either controlling or systematically varying the factors known to influence semantic processing when testing for deficits.
An intriguing notion is that it may be possible to devise sets of stimuli that vary on relevant factors but do not necessarily obey category distinctions. For example, with nonfocal damage such as dementia of the Alzheimer type, one should be able to show relative deficits within creatures and within nonliving things by judiciously choosing items based on the distributional statistics of susceptibility factors across individual exemplars. This may even be true for patients with relatively focal damage. For example, it may be possible to elucidate within-domain differential deficits by using imaging to localize the neural damage in a herpes simplex viral encephalitis patient and then devising test items based on the susceptibility factors plus the degree to which individual concepts depend on specific knowledge types. We hope that our feature norms and the related measures can assist those who wish to conduct such studies.
Implications for Theories
We began by highlighting the similarities and differences that exist among current theories of semantic memory organization (Table 1) . We argued that even though each theory emphasizes the importance of specific factors over others, the theories generally share more similarities than differences. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that the view we advocate overlaps to varying degrees with all of the relevant theories. A number of theories, most prominently the sensory/functional theory (Farah & McClelland, 1991; Martin et al., 2000; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) and the HIT , propose that knowledge types are central to explaining deficits. We extended these theories beyond a binary distinction and accounted for the tripartite distinction among creatures, fruits/vegetables, and nonliving things (as well as foods and musical instruments). Feature informativeness in various guises plays a prominent role in several theories (Devlin et al., 1998; Tyler & Moss, 2001) . Although this factor has yet to be incorporated explicitly into the other theories, it is doubtful that researchers would predict that it would not play at least some role in explaining observed patterns of deficits. Various researchers have emphasized visual complexity (Dixon et al., 1997) and neighborhood density in terms of visual and semantic similarity Dixon et al., 1997 Dixon et al., , 1998 ). Our analyses showed that both visual complexity and semantic similarity are part of an explanation of the behavioral trends. We also believe that visual similarity plays a role, but our analyses failed to provide sufficient insight. All theories posit that the probability that a concept will be preserved following damage is determined partially by the degree to which its referents and name are encountered, as estimated herein by concept familiarity ratings and word frequency counts respectively. Our analyses provided further evidence that this is indeed the case. Finally, although some theories have postulated a role for feature correlations (Devlin et al., 1998; Gonnerman et al., 1997; Tyler & Moss, 2001) , we found that it provides little insight into the trends. In summary, we suggest that all of these factors, with the exception of feature correlations, must be amalgamated to account for the full breadth of the behavioral phenomena.
Our view runs contrary, however, to any theory that dismisses knowledge types, as do the conceptual structure account (Tyler & Moss, 2001 ) and OUCH ). This is not to say that we disagree with all aspects of these theories. Both have made important contributions to our understanding of the importance of shared features, distinguishing features, and formfunction correlations (which we were unable to test). If these theories were amended to include knowledge types, which we believe our evidence argues they must be, it is not clear that they would make any empirical predictions that would distinguish them from the other available theories, including our own multifactor account.
Finally, dissatisfaction with existing knowledge-type theories has prompted some authors to appeal to an evolution-based domain-specific hypothesis (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998) . In our view, part of the appeal of the domain-specific hypothesis is the elegant manner with which it accounts for both the tripartite distinction and the failure to find convincing evidence for correlations among impaired categories and impaired knowledge types. We have presented data and arguments that can also explain these phenomena while avoiding many of the problems introduced by an evolutionary account (Rogers & Plaut, 2002) . We believe, therefore, that although further research into how evolutionary pressures may have shaped representations and computations used by the brain may broaden the understanding of neural and cognitive processing, our view obviates the need to turn to the domainspecific hypothesis to explain category-specific semantic deficits.
Conclusions
A multifactor account of the structure and computation of concrete noun concepts can explain the primary behavioral phenomena associated with category-specific semantic deficits. This account includes not only the knowledge types that may underlie these concepts in the mind and brain but also a number of other distributional factors that influence the representation and computation of concrete noun concepts. We believe that all of these factors influence the way in which these concepts are structured and computed and that therefore they must be integrated in a complete model of semantic memory.
Appendix B (continued) Domain
Category Concept Creatures (continued)
pet (22) bat_(animal) budgie canary cat chickadee dog finch goldfish guppy hamster hare iguana mink mouse parakeet pigeon pony python rabbit rat salamander turtle predator (17) alligator cat cheetah cougar coyote eagle falcon fox hawk hyena leopard lion mink owl panther tiger vulture reptile (10) alligator crocodile eel iguana python rattlesnake salamander toad tortoise turtle rodent (10) chipmunk gopher groundhog hamster mole_(animal) mouse rabbit raccoon rat squirrel scavenger (8) buzzard crow hawk hyena raccoon rat raven vulture Nonliving things appliance (14) blender dishwasher drill fan_(appliance) freezer fridge kettle microwave mixer oven radio stove telephone toaster automobile (9) ambulance car dunebuggy jeep limousine taxi trolley truck van building (7) barn cathedral chapel church inn shed skyscraper clothing (39) apron belt blouse boots bra camisole cap_(hat) cape cloak coat dress earmuffs gloves gown hose_(leggings) jacket jeans leotards mink_(coat) mittens nightgown nylons pajamas pants parka robe scarf shawl shirt shoes skirt slippers socks sweater swimsuit tie trousers veil vest container (14) ashtray bag barrel basket bin_(waste) bottle box bucket freezer jar mug pot sack urn fashion accessory (9) belt bracelet buckle gloves necklace scarf shawl tie vest furniture (15) bed bench bookcase bureau cabinet chair couch desk dresser lamp rocker shelves sofa stool_(furniture) table gun (7) bayonet bazooka cannon pistol revolver rifle shotgun house (8) apartment building bungalow cabin cottage hut shack shell machine (9) blender catapult crane_(machine) helicopter mouse_(computer) projector tank_(army) tractor typewriter shelter (10) apartment barn building bungalow cabin cottage house shack shed tent tool (34) axe bolts broom brush chain chisel clamp comb corkscrew crowbar drill fork hammer hatchet hoe ladle level microscope paintbrush pencil pliers rake sandpaper scissors screwdriver screws shovel sledgehammer spade spear stick tomahawk wheelbarrow wrench utensil (22) bowl broom colander corkscrew cup dish fork grater hatchet knife ladle mixer mug paintbrush pan pen pencil pot spatula spoon strainer tongs vehicle (27) airplane ambulance bike boat bus canoe car cart dunebuggy helicopter jeep motorcycle sailboat scooter ship skateboard submarine tank_(army) tractor trailer train tricycle trolley truck van wagon yacht weapon (39) armor axe baton bat_(baseball) bayonet bazooka belt bomb bow_(weapon) cannon catapult crossbow crowbar dagger grenade gun hammer harpoon hatchet hoe knife machete missile pistol revolver rifle rock rocket shield shotgun shovel sledgehammer slingshot spear stick stone sword tomahawk whip miscellaneous
anchor ball balloon banner basement bathtub bedroom beehive board_(black) board_(wood) book bouquet bow_(ribbon) brick bridge buggy bullet cage candle cap_(bottle) card_(greeting) carpet cellar certificate chandelier cigar cigarette clock closet coin cork crayon crown cupboard curtains cushion doll door doorknob drain drapes elevator emerald envelope escalator faucet fence football garage gate helmet hook hose jet key kite lantern magazine marble mat medal menu mirror muzzle napkin pearl peg pier pillow pin pipe_(plumbing) pipe_(smoking) plate plug_(electric) pyramid racquet raft rattle razor ring_(jewelry) rope ruler saddle sandals saucer sink skillet skis sled sleigh stereo subway surfboard tack tank_(container) tap tape_(scotch) thermometer thimble toilet toy tray tripod umbrella unicycle wall walnut wand wheel whistle Fruits/ vegetables fruit (29) apple avocado banana blueberry cantaloupe cherry coconut cranberry grape grapefruit honeydew lemon lime mandarin nectarine olive orange peach pear pineapple plum prune pumpkin raisin raspberry rhubarb strawberry tangerine tomato plant (18) asparagus beans beets celery corn cucumber dandelion eggplant honeydew oak onions parsley pineapple rhubarb seaweed tomato vine willow root/tuber (7) beets carrot garlic potato radish turnip yam vegetable (31) asparagus avocado beans beets broccoli cabbage carrot cauliflower celery corn cucumber eggplant garlic lettuce mushroom olive onions parsley peas pepper pickle potato pumpkin radish rhubarb rice spinach tomato turnip yam zucchini Salient exceptions food (6) biscuit bread cake cheese pickle pie musical instruments
accordion bagpipe banjo cello clarinet drum flute guitar harmonica harp harpsichord keyboard_(musical) piano saxophone trombone trumpet tuba violin
Note. Numbers in parentheses after category names are the number of concepts included as exemplars of that category. Words in parentheses after concepts are qualifiers used to disambiguate the concepts they are joined to by an underscore.
